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In this dissertation, I explore a topic that, despite the vast secondary literature on 
Descartes, has been under-explored. Although there has been substantial discussion of 
Descartes on issues closely tied to the will—for example, the plausibility of his theory of 
belief and his conception of freedom—a relative lack of attention has been paid to 
Descartes’ conception of the will itself and the role the will plays in those issues. 
There may be several reasons for this. First, Descartes does not have one work in 
which he systematically lays out his conception of the will. Instead, he discusses the will 
throughout his corpus seemingly only incidentally as it arises in various contexts. 
Furthermore, Descartes’ notion of the will intersects with a wide range of philosophical 
areas—it doesn’t fall squarely into one of the main areas that have been focused on in the 
literature on Descartes. And traditionally in the English-language literature, there has 
been a focus on Descartes’ epistemology, metaphysics, and natural philosophy, and less 
interest in what he has to say about moral philosophy, and moral psychology in 
particular—areas in which the will figures prominently. Recently, with growing scholarly 
interest in Descartes’ final work, The Passions of the Soul, it is clear that in this work 
Descartes reveals previously unappreciated aspects of his conception of the will. Lastly, 
the will is tied to what has been seen by many as the more confusing, or objectionable,
aspects of Descartes’ philosophy: his theory of judgment, his view on human freedom, 








The aim of this dissertation is to pursue a wider-ranging exploration of the human 
will in Descartes’ thought than has been previously carried out in the English-language 
literature. Discussion of the will has largely been limited to the Fourth Meditation and the 
issues that arise therein. I expand the scope of the investigation: I look at a broader range 
of texts—from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (the Regulae), Descartes’ earliest 
unpublished work, to The Passions of the Soul, his last published work. In so doing, I 
identify and explore continuities and developments in his views. My approach in this 
dissertation is to explore the will in contexts that Descartes himself delineates and to 
provide answers to the questions that arise organically from those contexts.  
I begin in Chapter 1 with the question of why Descartes construes judgment as an 
operation of the will in the Meditations. I notice that this is a change in view from the 
Regulae and argue that to make sense of this change, we need to consider Descartes’ 
conceptions of error and activity in the Regulae. I trace the development in his 
philosophical views about error and activity from the Regulae to the Meditations and 
show that these commitments can help to make sense of his mature theory of judgment. 
In Chapter 2, I then turn to Descartes’ conception of freedom in the Fourth 
Meditation. I suggest that to make sense of Descartes’ remarks on freedom, including his 
much-contested definition of freedom, we need to understand his conception of the 
will—in particular, its unlimited scope, its indifference (the state of the will when agents 
do not clearly see what is true or good), and its tendency towards the true and the good. I 
argue that Descartes does not hold that freedom consists in a two-way power that is 
undetermined; rather, freedom is compatible with determination and consists in the power 








to clarify and unify Descartes’ characterization of freedom in the Fourth Meditation: we 
see that freedom is proportional to the ease of the will’s determination of itself.
I end the dissertation with a discussion of the relationship between the will and 
the passions of the soul (the passions) in Chapter 3. I first address the question of how the 
passions affect the will, and I argue for a “bifurcated” approach to the function of the 
passions. According to this interpretation, the passions affect the will differently 
depending on what kind of volition results—volitions involved in action or volitions 
involved in judgment. In coordination with one another and with sensations, the passions 
lead the will to form volitions involved in action. Alternatively, they influence the will to 
form volitions involved in judgment by strengthening and preserving thoughts that are 
beneficial to the mind-body composite in some way. I then discuss several ways in which 
Descartes conceives of the passions as problematic and in need of our control. I conclude
by exploring three means Descartes prescribes for controlling them: habituation, indirect 
control, and the regulation of desire. 
In this investigation of the will in Descartes’ thought, I do not address several 
issues in which the will plays an important role. The will is central to Descartes’ 
conceptions of générosité and virtue, towards which I only gesture in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, I do not here address Descartes’ view on weakness of soul, which is 
intimately tied to his conception of the will. My hope is that this investigation is the 
beginning of a more comprehensive project that incorporates these other issues of the will 
in Descartes’ thought. 
This project could not have been completed without the contributions and support 
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Chapter 1  
Error, Activity, and the Theory of Judgment  
Introduction
The theory of judgment that Descartes presents in the Fourth Meditation seems quite 
problematic to many. According to this theory, judgment is the product of two faculties, 
the intellect and the will. The intellect supplies the subject matter of the judgment, and 
the will then affirms or denies what the intellect perceives (AT VII 56-62; CSM II 39-
43).1 Some have taken the main problem with making judgment an operation of the will, 
as this theory does, to be that belief then seems to be a kind of voluntary action, akin to 
deciding what to do.2 But this strikes many as implausible—we don’t have the same kind 
of control over our beliefs, they say, as we do over our decisions.
One strategy for dealing with the seeming implausibility of this theory of 
judgment is to give a story that accounts for why Descartes would have held such a view. 
The standard approach of this kind, what I will call the “theodicean explanation,” focuses 
on the origin of the theory of judgment to account for its idiosyncrasies. This approach 
first finds a theodicy—an explanation of how the existence of a good God is compatible 
1 Descartes also explicitly affirms this theory of judgment in the Principles. See Principles I. 34 (AT VIIIA
18; CSM I 204).
2 E. M. Curley interprets Spinoza as making an objection of this sort. See Curley 1975, esp. 167-178. For a 
contemporary discussion of this issue, see Della Rocca 2006, 148-152. In this chapter, I will raise





                                                 
          
    
 
           
            
         
   
    
 
with the existence of evil—that Descartes would likely have been familiar with. The 
argument then goes that Descartes adapted the theodicy for his own purposes, and that his 
theory of judgment falls out of that adaptation. For example, Etienne Gilson argues that 
the theory of judgment of the Fourth Meditation results from Descartes’ application of 
Aquinas’ theodicy to the Cartesian version of the problem of evil, the problem of error. 
Descartes lumps together erroneous judgment and sinful volition in his theory of 
judgment by making judgment an act of the will. He then can use Aquinas’ arguments 
concerning the problem of evil to exonerate God from human error in the Fourth 
Meditation.3 Alternatively, Stephen Menn argues that Descartes adapts Augustine’s 
theodicy from De Libero Arbitrio.4 
I don’t think that this account is right, for the reasons I outline in the first section 
of this chapter.5 But there seems to be very little in Descartes’ own work with which to 
generate an alternative.6 Descartes does not present a clear statement of the theory of 
judgment in his own published and unpublished works until the Meditations. In fact, the 
theory of judgment of the Fourth Meditation seems to represent a change in Descartes’ 
thought on judgment. We see this from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae 
ad Directionem Ingenii, what I’ll refer to as the Regulae), Descartes’ first major 
unpublished work written at least thirteen years before the publication of the 
3 Gilson, 1913. Ariew et al. also tentatively put forward the theodicean explanation to explain the 
development of Descartes’ view of judgment. See the entry on judgment, Ariew et al. 2003, 148. See Caton 
1975, 90 for another version of the theodicean explanation.
4 See Menn 1998, 301-336 and 302, in particular, for evidence that he advocates the theodicean 
explanation. See Matthews 2008 for a critical exploration of Menn’s view that Descartes’ Fourth 
Meditation theodicy is a restatement of Augustine’s theodicy from De Libero Arbitrio.
5 Others who disagree with the theodicean explanation include Rosenthal 1986 and Wilson 1978.
6 David Rosenthal focuses on the Meditations to provide a non-theodicean account of why Descartes makes
judgment an operation of the will. According to his view, the theory of judgment “is a direct response to the 







                                                 
     
  
 
    
     
    
Meditations.7 In the Regulae, Descartes does not have a full-fledged theory of judgment. 
But he seems to hold the standard scholastic view8 that judgment is an operation of the 
intellect: for example, he says, “we distinguish between the faculty by which our intellect 
intuits and knows things and the faculty by which it makes affirmative or negative 
judgments” (CSM I 45; AT X 420).9 
Although the Regulae does not provide us with much direct illumination on the 
development of Descartes’ theory of judgment, I will suggest that it does provide us with 
other resources for understanding why Descartes ends up conceiving judgment as an act 
of the will. In the Regulae, Descartes lays out a substantive theory of error that has 
important continuities with the theory of error he presents in the Meditations.
Furthermore, in the Regulae, Descartes introduces a distinction between activity and 
passivity that will become central to demarcating the faculties of the intellect and the will 
in his later works. I will argue that the continuities in his theory of error and the 
distinction between activity and passivity can be marshaled to provide a plausible 
alternative to the theodicean explanation. 
In this chapter, I begin with two reasons for why we should seek an alternative to 
the theodicean explanation. Next, I discuss Descartes’ theory of error, first in the 
Regulae, and then in the Meditations, with a brief discussion of the Discourse along the 
way. I then show the development of Descartes’ activity-passivity distinction and present 
an interpretation of it, which, lastly, I argue shows us that Descartes conceives of both 
7 Jean-Paul Weber’s detailed study, La constitution du texte des “Regulae,” dates the writing of the  
Regulae to the period between 1619 and 1628. 
8 See Menn 1998, 310 for a general characterization of the scholastic account of the intellect and Kenny  
1972, 3-5 for a characterization of Aquinas’ conception of judgment.
9 Anthony Kenny also takes Descartes as holding the view in the Regulae that judgment is an act of the  










                                                 
     
 
error, from the Regulae to the Meditations, and judgment in the Meditations as resulting 
from mental activity. My goal, in tracing out these previously unnoticed developments in 
Descartes’ thought, is to show that Descartes holds other philosophical commitments that 
might have structured his theory of judgment.
I. Problems with the theodicean explanation
As I explained, the theodicean explanation holds that Descartes makes judgment an 
operation of the will solely because of the demands of the theodicy of the Fourth 
Meditation. But there are two pressing problems with this view.
First, I will address what I call the ad hoc objection. The theodicean explanation 
makes Descartes’ theory of judgment seem ad hoc, as it postulates that the theory of 
judgment was formulated directly in response to the theodicean concerns of the Fourth 
Meditation. This is a problem because Descartes’ theory of judgment is clearly not ad 
hoc—it is, in fact, central to the Meditations, as it is presupposed by Descartes’ method 
of doubt.10 Early in the First Meditation, Descartes proposes the method of doubt:
Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from 
opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully 
as I do from those which are patently false. So for the purpose of rejecting 
all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some 
reason for doubt. (AT VII 18; CSM II 12)
At this point, it seems that the method of doubt requires only that we seek (and find) 
some reason for doubt. Yet some of our former beliefs are recalcitrant—to doubt them, 
they require more than simply seeking reasons for doubt: 








My habitual opinions keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, they 
capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result of 
long occupation and the law of custom. I shall never get out of the habit of 
confidently assenting to these opinions, so long as I suppose them to be 
what in fact they are, namely highly probable opinions which, despite the 
fact that they are in a sense doubtful…it is still much more reasonable to 
believe than to deny. (AT VII 22; CSM II 15) 
Descartes thus suggests a stronger approach: to doubt these opinions, he thinks “it will be 
a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by 
pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary” (AT VII 
22; CSM II 15). At this point, the participation of the will in the method of doubt seems 
tied to our supposing that what we believed to be true is in fact false. Yet Descartes states 
in the Fourth Meditation that the will can suspend judgment about all matters that we do 
not clearly and distinctly perceive. It is only when the will affirms or denies something 
that the intellect puts forth that we make judgments, and the will can refrain from 
affirming and denying what the intellect puts forth, as long as we do not clearly and 
distinctly perceive it. This capacity of the will to suspend judgment enables us to 
systematically doubt even our most habitual opinions.
There is a second and more fundamental objection to the theodicean explanation: 
the theory that errors, like all judgments, are acts of the will does not seem to be 
Descartes’ ultimate solution to the problem of reconciling his errors with his creation by a 
perfect God. Toward the end of the Fourth Meditation Descartes entertains the possibility
that God could have created him in such a way that he would never make a mistake while 
being completely free. In presenting this possibility, he seems to give his ultimate 
explanation of error: that it was better for the world as a whole to have parts that are not 
immune from error. He says, “I cannot deny that there may in some way be more 









                                                 
 
error, while others are immune, than there would be if all the parts were exactly alike” 
(AT VII 51; CSM II 42-43). In other words, the ultimate explanation of error seems to be 
that the more diversity in the world, the more perfect the world is, and Descartes says, “I 
have no right to complain that the role God wished me to undertake in the world is not 
the principal one or the most perfect of all” (AT VII 51; CSM II 43).11 For there to be 
such diversity in the world, Descartes need only hold that some parts be subject to error. 
If this is his ultimate explanation of error, it is unclear why judgment has to be attributed 
to the will.
Thus, even if the theodicean explanation survived the ad hoc objection, it does not 
sufficiently explain why judgment has to be an act of the will. These two objections serve 
as compelling reasons to search for an alternative explanation for the development of 
Descartes’ theory of judgment. I begin my sketch of an alternative by discussing 
Descartes’ theory of error, from the Regulae to the Meditations. 
II. Theory of error of the Regulae
The Regulae has been viewed in the literature as significant primarily for the light it 
sheds on Descartes’ method of inquiry. Yet, as I will show, it also provides us with much 
insight into his thoughts on error. I will argue that error in the Regulae is not simply the 
falsity of our judgments but that it is also a function of the process by which the judgment 
arises. Specifically, in the Regulae error occurs when we misuse the sole faculty of 
knowledge—the intellect—by composing objects of our thought using processes that do 
not lead to certain knowledge.








                                                 
  
   
  
     
 
     
     
      
        
      
  
    
Some important background information will provide the context. In the Regulae, 
Descartes is first and foremost concerned with developing a “method” that will allow us 
to reliably increase our knowledge of truths, to reach “a true understanding of everything 
within one’s capacity” (AT X 372; CSM I 16).12 Descartes defines method in the 
following way: 
By ‘a method’ I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that 
if one follows them exactly one will never take what is false to be true or 
fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly 
increase one’s knowledge till one arrives at a true understanding of 
everything within one’s capacity. (AT X 371-372; CSM I 16)
The model he uses for knowledge is mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) and he takes 
the certainty of mathematics to be largely unproblematic.13 Descartes says of arithmetic 
and geometry: “where these sciences are concerned it scarcely seems humanly possible to 
err, except through inadvertence” (AT X 365; CSM I 12). 
Descartes focuses in the Regulae on the faculty of the intellect, because at this 
point in his thought, the intellect is the only faculty of knowledge. He says, “it is the 
intellect alone that is capable of knowledge” (AT X 398; CSM I 32) and “it is of course 
only the intellect that is capable of perceiving the truth” (AT X 411; CSM I 39). The 
other mental faculties Descartes discusses at any length in the Regulae—imagination, 
sense perception, and memory—are subsidiary faculties and merely “help” or “hinder”
12 Stephen Gaukroger says that Descartes’ search for a “method” was for a fundamental discipline, “a
master problem-solving discipline which underlay every area of inquiry, physical and mathematical” 
(Gaukroger 2002, 8). For additional general thoughts on how the Regulae illuminates Descartes’ method,
see Curley 1978, 21-45 and Beck 1952. In this chapter I cannot address the controversy prominent in the 
secondary literature on the Regulae about the relationship between Descartes’ “universal method” and
“mathesis universalis” (AT XI 378), and thus I do not take up the textual debate about Rule IV initiated in
1964 by Jean-Paul Weber’s La constitution du texte des Regulae. Weber’s argument that Rule IV should be
viewed as two heterogeneous and incompatible sections, IV-A (AT X 371-374; CSM I 15-17) and IV-B 
(AT X 374-379; CSM I 20) has been the source of much discussion, including Marion 1975, Van De Pitte
1979, Kraus 1983, Van De Pitte 1991, and most recently, Doyle 2009.
13 E. M. Curley highlights this as one way in which the Regulae differs from Descartes’ later works. See






                                                 
           
 
  
      
            
 
    
    
    
   
      
 
(AT X 398; CSM I 32) the intellect.14 Without the intellect, these other faculties cannot 
give us knowledge.15 
In the Regulae, there are only two processes that lead to knowledge, intuition and 
necessary deduction (AT X 368,16 372, 425; CSM I 14, 16, 48). Not only are these the 
exclusive processes by which we have knowledge, but moreover, they enable us have 
“knowledge of things with no fear of being mistaken,” he says (AT X 368; CSM I 14). 
This is a bold claim. Unlike in the Meditations, Descartes here is not worried about 
justifying his view that these processes unproblematically lead us to certain knowledge, 
as he does not entertain the possibility of global skepticism in the Regulae. Intuition and 
deduction, Descartes thinks, are “the simplest of all” of the operations of our minds “and 
quite basic” (AT X 372; CSM I 16). They are so simple and basic that he holds that his 
method does not need to instruct us how to carry them out. In fact, intuition and 
deduction underlie Descartes’ inquiry in the Regulae—they allow us to carry out the rules 
that will allow us to have knowledge of “everything within [our] capacity” (CSM I, 16; 
AT X, 372): he says that “if our intellect were not already able to perform them, it would 
not comprehend any of the rules of the method, however easy they might be” (CSM I, 16; 
AT X, 372). 
14 Descartes discusses the ways in which the other faculties affect the intellect in the first part of Rule 12. 
See AT X 410-417; CSM I 39-43. Since Descartes’ discussion here does not affect my point that in the 
Regulae the intellect is the main faculty of knowledge, I will not go into the details of his account here.
15 This changes in the Meditations—in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes holds that sensations—what we
receive through sense perception—“inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful for the composite of 
which the mind is a part; to this extent they are sufficiently clear and distinct” (AT VII 83; CSM II 57). I 
take it that Descartes calling sensations “sufficiently clear and distinct” in this respect means that he holds
that they are a genuine source of knowledge, knowledge about what’s beneficial or harmful to the mind-
body composite. Yet in the Meditations, like in the Regulae, the senses by themselves cannot give us
metaphysical knowledge—knowledge about the essential nature of bodies: “this is an area where they
provide only very obscure information” (AT VII 83; CSM II 58).
16 L. J. Beck notes that there is some question about the term at AT X 368—whether it is inductio or 
deductio—due to differences in the manuscripts (Beck 1952, 84, note 3). Yet Descartes’ point here is 






                                                 




   
Descartes defines intuition as “the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which 
is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are 
understanding” (AT X 368; CSM I 14). Because intuition is so easy and distinct, what we 
know from intuition is “self-evident” (AT X 369; CSM I 14), and “certain” (AT X 369; 
CSM I 14). The primary objects of intuition are simple natures.17 Descartes frames his 
discussion of simple natures not in terms of “how they exist in reality”, but rather “only 
in so far as they are perceived by the intellect” (AT X 418; CSM I 44). He illustrates the 
difference with the example of a body—that is, a material object. A body cannot exist 
without also having extension and shape, and thus, “with respect to the thing itself, it is 
one single and simple entity” (AT X 418; CSM I 44). But we can conceptually 
distinguish between corporeal nature, extension, and shape, and so with respect to the 
intellect, Descartes holds that “we call [the body] a composite made up of these three 
natures” (AT X 418; CSM I 44). Simple natures then are “only those things which we 
know so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into others which 
are more distinctly known” (AT X 418; CSM I 44). 
Descartes gives many examples of simple natures,18 and in Rule 12 he groups 
them into three main categories: the “purely intellectual,” the “purely material,” and 
“common notions” (AT X 419; CSM I 44-45). “Those simple natures which the intellect 
recognizes by means of a sort of innate light, without the aid of any corporeal image, are 
purely intellectual” (AT X 419; CSM I 44), he says. Knowledge, doubt, ignorance and 
17 Although not the only objects—Descartes also holds that we intuit composite natures, as I will discuss  
shortly.
18 I will not undertake the task of reconciling and figuring out the underlying commonality between the two  







                                                 
    
 
volition are examples of purely intellectual simple natures. Those simple natures 
recognized to be present only in bodies are purely material, such as shape, extension, and 
motion. Common notions are those simple natures that sometimes apply to bodies and 
sometimes apply to minds—for example, existence, unity, and duration. Rules of 
inference and notions that connect simple natures are common notions—for example, 
“things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other,” and “things that 
cannot be related in the same way to a third thing are different in some respect” (AT X 
419; CSM I 45).19 
In contrast with his discussion of simple natures, Descartes focuses in his 
discussion of composite natures on the processes by which we have access to them. He 
differentiates between two kinds of composite natures: those that we experience as 
composite, and those that are composite because we ourselves compose them. The first is 
not a source of error, but the second is: Descartes says “there can be no falsity save in 
composite natures which are put together by the intellect” (AT X 399; CSM I 32), and
“we can be deceived only when we ourselves compose in some way the things we 
believe” (AT X 423). We experience composite natures “by sense, whatever we hear 
from others, and generally, whatever arrives at our intellect either from elsewhere or from 
the intellect’s reflection on itself” (AT X 422). It is surprising that experience understood 
in this way would not be a source of error, and Descartes does seem to allow for error 
from experience:
19 Corresponding privations and negations are also simple natures—for example, nothing, an instant, and 










                                                 
              
   




         
  
The intellect can never be deceived by any experience if it considers20 
precisely only the thing presented to it, according to whether it has it either 
in itself or in an image,21 and furthermore, does not judge that the 
imagination faithfully represents the objects of the senses, or that the 
senses take on the true shapes of things, or finally, that external things are 
not always such as they appear to be. (AT X 423)
In this passage, Descartes seems to imply that there are situations in which the intellect 
can be deceived by experience—namely, those circumstances in which the intellect does 
not do the things he prescribes. Looking more closely, though, we can see that those 
circumstances are cases in which we ourselves compose what we believe—that is, cases 
in which “we believe that there is something in [the things we understand] which has 
been perceived immediately by our mind without any experience” (AT X 423). 
Descartes’ example of the jaundiced man makes this clear:
For example, if someone who has jaundice persuades himself that what he 
sees is yellow, this thought of his will be composed from what his 
imagination represents to him and from what he assumes of himself, 
namely, that the color does not appear yellow because of some defect of 
the eye, but because the things he sees really are yellow. (AT X 423)
Descartes says explicitly that in this case we ourselves compose what we believe, but he 
also characterizes the case as one in which the intellect has not restricted itself to only the 
thing presented to it. Instead, contrary to Descartes’ prohibition, the intellect has in this 
case judged that external things are as they appear to be. It is not the experience per se of 
the jaundiced man that leads to error, but rather his assumption that his perceptions of 
20 The translation, thanks to Ed Curley, that I employ of the paragraph at AT X 422-423, beginning “Sixth,
we say… [Dicimus sexto],” differs with CSM. I will note the differences if they have some philosophical 
import. The verb here is intueatur, a form of intueri, which CSM treats as a technical term, translating it as 
“intuit.” But intueri has a broad range of meaning, and Descartes does not consistently use it as a technical 
term. Specifically, he does not seem to be using it as a technical term here, because he is talking about 
experimenta, which, as he has just explained, include a wide range of mental phenomena.
21 The term is phantasma, which CSM translates “imagination.” But it looks as though Descartes uses
imaginatio or phantasia when he wants to refer to the faculty, and phantasma to refer to the images that 







                                                 
 
      
     
things as yellow represent the way the world really is—that is, that the world really is 
yellow. 
Thus, although Descartes talks of composite natures as containing falsity, it is not 
the composite-ness of the object that makes it false or erroneous. It is not the fact that 
what we believe or judge is composite as opposed to simple that accounts for the error, 
since things we experience as composite don’t contain error in themselves. Descartes also 
says “there can be no falsity in the mere intuition of things, be they simple or conjoined” 
(AT X 432; CSM I 53, my emphasis). Thus, if we intuit a conjoined thing (another term 
for composite nature22), we cannot go wrong. Instead, as we have seen, Descartes holds 
that error arises in composite natures only when “we ourselves put them together” (AT X 
422; CSM I 46). So error does not reside in the composite nature of the object of thought 
but is a result of our composing it wrongly.23 
Descartes specifically notes three ways that composition can come about— 
through impulse, through conjecture, and through deduction. All three forms of 
composition may lead to error. The error from composition has to do with the specific 
way we come to have our belief. With composition by impulse, we err because “our mind 
leads us to believe something, not because good reasons convince us of it, but simply 
because we are determined to believe it [sed tantum determinati]” (AT X 424). Descartes 
distinguishes three causes of composition through impulse—some superior power, our 
freedom (propria libertate), and the disposition of the imagination. But the first is never a 
22 In talking about composition, Descartes alternately interchanges and glosses “composition”  
(compositionem) with what CSM translates as “conjoined” (conjunctas, e.g. AT X 425; CSM I 48) and “put  
together” (componimus, e.g. AT X 399; CSM I 32).
23 Descartes holds that there is one way in which we can compose the objects of thought without erring—  






                                                 
  
             
     
source of error. It is only when we ourselves are the cause of our belief that we err: our 
freedom is “rarely” (but, presumably, at times) a source of error whereas the disposition 
of the imagination is “almost always” (AT X 424; CSM I 47). It is interesting that in the 
Regulae, our freedom is rarely a source of error, for in the Meditations, our freedom 
always plays a role in our errors when we don’t have sufficient reason.24 The second kind 
of composition, composition by conjecture, leads to error when we “surmise” (AT X 424;
CSM I 47) something and “assert it to be true” when we should instead “judge it to be 
merely probable” (AT X 424; CSM I 48). Lastly, composition by deduction leads to error 
when we conjoin objects of belief without any necessary connection between them. An 
example of this kind of composition is when we conclude that a space full of air is empty 
simply because our senses do not perceive anything in it. In this case, we are incorrectly 
combining the nature of the space with the nature of a vacuum. The error of each of the 
three forms of composition stems from the way the belief is formed—that we believe it 
not because of reason; that we surmise it; and that we conjoin things when there is no 
necessary connection between them.
The last form of composition, deduction, can be carried out in such a way that we 
never make mistakes. Recall that deduction is the second process of the intellect, along 
with intuition, by which we can have certain knowledge. Deduction is “the inference of 
something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with 
certainty” (AT X 369; CSM I 15).25 Deduction differs from intuition mainly in that the 
process is not immediate; rather, since deduction is an inference, there is a “movement of 
24 That is, when we don’t clearly and distinctly perceive something as true or good.
25 Despite Descartes’ characterization of deduction here, deduction does not require a plurality of premises.  
Descartes calls inferring a proposition immediately from first principles a kind of deduction—see AT X  





                                                 
               
     
   
        
       
thought” (AT X 369-370; CSM I 15). So unlike intuition, deduction is not necessarily 
immediately self-evident because one must mentally move from one proposition to the 
next. But if the deduction occurs swiftly and in a continuous movement, “[we] seem to 
intuit the whole thing at once” (AT X 388; CSM I 25). Descartes says, 
“deduction…remains as our sole means of compounding things in a way that enables us 
to be certain of their truth” (AT X 424; CSM I 48). But Descartes notes that “even with 
deduction there can be many drawbacks” (AT X 424; CSM I 48)—that we can in fact 
make mistakes. To carry out deduction in the right way, the intellect must only compose 
things if the connection between the two things is necessary: “it is within our power to 
avoid this error, viz. by never conjoining things unless we intuit that the conjunction of 
one with the other is wholly necessary” (AT X 425; CSM I 48). So, there is only one 
“right” way for composition to occur that is relevant for his method: necessary deduction. 
All other forms of composition can lead to error.26 
It follows for Descartes that we ought not form the objects of our thought through 
these other processes, even though it is possible for the process to generate a true belief. 
He says that his aim in part is “to see where falsity can come in, so that we may guard 
against it, and to see what can be known with certainty, so that we may concern ourselves 
exclusively with that” (AT X 417; CSM I 43). Processes other than intuition and 
necessary deduction allow “falsity to come in,” and although it is possible that they could 
lead to true beliefs, what would be known would not be known with certainty. 
26 Technically, there is another form of composition that does not lead to error, but Descartes dismisses this
as irrelevant, since it does not fall within the scope of his method. When composition by impulse is caused 
by “some superior power,” we never err, as I mentioned above. Since Descartes is concerned with
formulating a procedure that we can follow in order to have knowledge, and we cannot make ourselves









III. The theory of error in the Meditations
I will now turn to Descartes’ theory of error in the Meditations. In the Fourth Meditation, 
Descartes focuses on providing an explanation for why we err. The framework for the 
theory of error in the Meditations differs drastically from that of the Regulae. The Fourth 
Meditation comes on the heels of Descartes’ first proof of the existence of God in the 
Third Meditation, which relies on conceiving God as “a most perfect being” (AT VII 51; 
CSM II 35). At the end of the Third Meditation, Descartes points out one particular 
consequence of God’s perfection: his non-deception, or veracity. If God is all-perfect, 
Descartes reasons, he must not be a deceiver, since deception is an imperfection. 
Descartes thus begins the Fourth Meditation with the worry: if an all-perfect, non-
deceiving God exists, then why do we make mistakes in judgment? In the Meditations, 
then, Descartes has a significant concern that was absent in the Regulae: to explain how 
our errors are compatible with God’s nature. 
Before he gives his solution to this problem, Descartes spells out two doctrines 
that arise from these properties of God:  (1) that every faculty is “perfect of its kind” (AT 
VII 55; CSM II 38), and (2) that no faculty would lead to error if used correctly. The first 
doctrine arises as consequence of God’s perfection. Descartes reasons, “the more skilled 
the craftsman the more perfect the work produced by him; if this is so, how can anything 
produced by the supreme creator of all things not be complete and perfect in all 
respects?” (AT VII 55; CSM II 38). The second doctrine arises as a consequence of 
God’s veracity—that no faculty would lead to error if used correctly: “since God does not 
wish to deceive me, he surely did not give me the kind of faculty which would ever 






                                                 
         
       
   
      
        
   
 
  
Descartes then applies these two doctrines to the two faculties he is focused on in 
the Fourth Meditation, the intellect and the will. As I will discuss further in the next 
section, between the time of the Regulae and the Meditations, Descartes’ model of the 
mind changes significantly. In the Regulae, as we saw, the intellect is the main faculty 
and memory, imagination, and sense perception are all subsidiary faculties that serve only 
to help or hinder the intellect. By the time of the Meditations, Descartes has developed a 
two-faculty psychology in which the intellect is the mind’s passivity (with imagination 
and sense perception subsumed under it), and the will is the mind’s activity.27 
To figure out the nature of his errors, then, Descartes must inspect each of the 
faculties one at a time to see whether either faculty is responsible for error, and if so, 
how. The first doctrine—that each faculty is perfect of its kind—has distinct implications 
for the intellect and the will because of the difference in their natures. That the intellect is 
perfect means that “it turns out to contain no error in the proper sense of that term” (AT 
VII 56; CSM II 39). Since “all the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas 
which are subjects for possible judgments” (AT VII 56; CSM II 39), it is perfect in the 
sense that its perceptions never contain error “in the strict sense” (AT VII 43; CSM II 
30). The will’s perfection consists in the fact that “it is not restricted in any way” (AT VII 
56-57; CSM II 39) and, as a result, it has the ability to affirm, deny, or suspend judgment 
on any perception presented to it that is not clear and distinct.28 
27 Descartes most clearly and concisely presents his two-faculty psychology in Principles I.32: “All modes 
of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be brought under two general headings: perception, or
the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will. Sensory perception, imagination and 
pure understanding are simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt
are various modes of willing” (AT VIIIA 17; CSM I 204). He doesn’t specify, but I think memory also falls 
under the intellect.








                                                 
       
                
 
According to the second doctrine—that no faculty would lead to error if used 
correctly—when we make intellectual judgments we will never err as long as we use the 
will correctly. To use the will correctly, the will must affirm or deny only those things 
that the intellect perceives clearly and distinctly. Because the will’s perfection means that 
it has the ability to affirm, deny, or suspend judgment regarding anything that could lead 
us to err (any perception that is not clear and distinct), we are not doomed to error; we 
can always refrain from making a judgment about anything we do not clearly and 
distinctly perceive.29 
Error is not just a matter of the falsity of the judgment we make. When we affirm 
or deny something we do not clearly and distinctly perceive, we use our will incorrectly, 
even if the judgment that results is true: Descartes says that if it is “by pure chance that I 
arrive at the truth” then “I shall be at fault” (AT VII 60; CSM II 41). Error results when 
we improperly use our perfect faculties.
We can find the Fourth Meditation theory of error in the Discourse, albeit in 
much less detail. In the discussion of the ad hoc objection in the first section of this 
chapter, we saw that Descartes’ method of doubt presupposes his theory of judgment. 
Since Descartes’ theory of judgment is tied to his theory of error in the Fourth Meditation 
in the way that we have seen, if Descartes’ method of doubt is in the Discourse, we might 
expect his theory of error to appear in the Discourse as well. In fact, in Part II of the 
Discourse, Descartes gestures at his theory of error in the context of a discussion of his 
method of doubt. Regarding his method of doubt, Descartes says:
29 This is not to say that such refraining will always be easy—Descartes acknowledges at the end of the















Regarding the opinions to which I had hitherto given credence, I thought 
that I could not do better than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in 
order to replace them afterwards with better ones, or with the same ones 
once I had squared them with the standards of reason. (AT VI 13-14; CSM 
I 117)
It is in this context that Descartes discusses his “true method of attaining the knowledge 
of everything within [his] mental capabilities” (AT VI 17; CSM I 119). In the first rule of 
this method for attaining knowledge, Descartes anticipates the theory of error that he 
elaborates on in the Fourth Meditation:
The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident 
knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions 
and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgements than 
what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no 
occasion to doubt it. (AT VI 18; CSM I 120)
Here, Descartes says that we may avoid error if we only make judgments about things we 
clearly and distinctly perceive. But although the substance of the theory of error is the 
same, in the Discourse, unlike in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes does not cast his 
theory of error in the framework of a discussion of God’s nature. 
IV. Activity and passivity of the mind
In this section I will focus on Descartes’ distinction between activity and passivity. I will 
begin by showing that Descartes employs a distinction between activity and passivity30 in 
the Regulae and tracing his use of this distinction through to the Meditations and his
correspondence of that time. We will see that in his works after the Regulae, the 
distinction becomes central to demarcating the faculties of the will and the intellect. I will 
30 In my discussion of the distinction between activity and passivity, I include Descartes’ usages of the
Latin nouns “actio” and “passio,” Latin verbs “ago” and “patior,” the French nouns “action” and 











then develop an interpretation of what Descartes means by the notions of activity and 
passivity. 
Development of the distinction 
A notion of passivity first appears in Descartes’ discussion of sense perception in Rule 
12. Descartes says that sense perception is “merely passive” “in so far as our external 
senses are all parts of the body” (AT X 412; CSM I 40) and uses the example of wax to 
illustrate his point:
Sense-perception occurs in the same way in which wax takes on an 
impression from a seal. It should not be thought that I have a mere analogy 
in mind here: we must think of the external shape of the sentient body as 
being really changed by the object in exactly the same way as the shape of 
the surface of the wax is altered by the seal. (AT X 412; CSM I 40)
Here Descartes’ focus is not on the passivity of the mind but instead on the passivity of 
the body. Descartes holds that as the wax takes on the shape of the seal, when we 
perceive something through our senses, our body is physically altered by the action of the 
perceived object.  The part of the body involved in sensory perception—the eye, the ears, 
and the tongue—takes on a new shape through the perceiving—by the sound, the smell, 
and the flavor (AT X 413; CSM I 40). 
In the Regulae, Descartes also takes the notion of passivity (and its counterpart, 
activity) to apply to the mind. He says later in his discussion of Rule 12:
The power through which we know things in the strict sense is purely 
spiritual…It is one single power, whether it receives figures from the 
‘common’ sense at the same time as does the corporeal imagination, or 
applies itself to those which are preserved in the memory, or forms new 
ones which so preoccupy the imagination that it is often in no position to 
receive ideas from the ‘common’ sense at the same time, or transmit them 
to the power responsible for motion in accordance with a purely corporeal 
mode of operation. In all these functions the cognitive power is sometimes 







resembling the seal, sometimes the wax….According to its different 
functions, then, the same power is called either pure intellect, or 
imagination, or memory, or sense-perception. (AT X 415-416; CSM I 42)
It is important to note that the focus of this passage is to emphasize the unity of the mind. 
Descartes characterizes certain functions of the mind as passive and others as active, but 
they are all manifestations of the same “one single power.” But by the time of the 
Meditations, Descartes uses activity and passivity to distinguish his two main faculties of 
the mind, the intellect and the will, from one another. In his letter to Regius of May 1641, 
he explains:
Where you say ‘Willing and understanding differ only as different ways of 
acting in regard to different objects,’ I would prefer ‘They differ only as 
the activity and passivity of one and the same substance’ [differunt tantum 
ut actio et passio ejusdem substantiae]. For strictly speaking, 
understanding is the passivity of the mind and willing is its activity 
[intellectio enim proprie mentis passio est, et volitio ejus actio]; but 
because we cannot will anything without understanding what we will, and 
we scarcely ever understand something without at the same time willing 
something, we do not easily distinguish in this manner passivity from 
activity. (AT III 372; CSMK 182).
Thus, the distinction between activity and passivity of the mind has become central for 
Descartes in distinguishing between the operations of the will and the operations of the 
intellect. The will is responsible for all the active processes of the mind and the intellect 
for all passive processes. Descartes seems to temper the distinction between 
understanding and willing at the end of the passage, but I think he does this to bring out 
that the two powers work in concert with one another.
The role of the distinction in demarcating the two faculties is corroborated in a 
letter possibly to Mesland, written on May 2, 1644, three years after the first edition of 













between passivity and activity in relation to the example of the wax that he initially 
presented in the Regulae:
I regard the difference between the soul and its ideas as the same as that 
between a piece of wax and the various shapes it can take. Just as it is not 
an activity but a passivity in the wax to take various shapes, so, it seems to 
me, it is a passivity in the soul to receive one or another idea, and only its 
volitions are activities. (AT IV 113-114; CSMK 232).
Here, Descartes’ key example of mental passivity is sensory perception, which he also 
discusses in the Sixth Meditation. 
I am suggesting that these texts show a development in Descartes’ thought 
regarding the passivity/activity distinction. In the Regulae, Descartes employs the 
distinction but emphasizes the unity of the mind. By the time of the Meditations, 
however, this distinction is central to demarcating Descartes’ two mental faculties, the 
intellect and the will.
Understanding the distinction
Now that we see the development of the distinction into a criterion that distinguishes the 
will from the intellect, the question naturally arises—how should we understand this 
distinction? There is an intuitive sense of what the terms mean: we actively do something 
when we ourselves do it; we passively do something when it happens to us. In a 
discussion of Descartes on the will’s freedom, Harry Frankfurt sums up what I’m 
characterizing as this intuitive understanding in the following way: 
All of the movements of my will – for instance, my choices and decisions 
– are movements that I make. None is a mere impersonal occurrence, in 
which my will moves without my moving it. None of my choices or 
decisions merely happens. Its occurrence is my activity, and I can no more 
be a passive bystander with respect to my own choices and decisions than 
I can be passive with respect to any of my own actions. It is possible for 









                                                 
    
 
   
               
       
 
it. Now every willing is necessarily an action; unlike the movements of an 
arm, it is only as actions that volitions can occur. Thus, activity is of the 
essence of the will. Volition precludes passivity by its very nature.31 
I think that Descartes’ notions of activity and passivity for the most part align with this 
intuitive sense.32 To construct an interpretation of the distinction I will begin with an 
interpretation of the notion of passivity, and support it with Descartes’ examples. I will 
then use that interpretation as a springboard to understanding what Descartes means by 
activity.
From Descartes’ examples of passivity, we see that passivity involves receiving 
something (shape, in the case of bodies, and ideas, in the case of the mind), because the 
passive object is being acted on.33 As we saw in the passages from the Regulae, sense 
perception, when considered in terms of our bodies, is “merely passive” because our 
bodies are acted on by the objects of perception. As wax is acted on by a seal and thereby 
takes on its impression, our bodies in sense perception take on the shape of the object we 
are perceiving (AT X 412; CSM I 140, also AT X 415; CSM I 42). 
This understanding of passivity also underlies Descartes’ examples of the 
passivity of the mind. In all of Descartes’ examples of mental passivity, the mind is 
receiving something, whether it is “figures,” “ideas of sensible objects,” or “ideas” more 
generally. In Rule 12, I think Descartes conceives of “receiv[ing] figures from the 
‘common’ sense” as one of the passive functions of the cognitive power (AT XI 415; 
CSM I 42). He is explicit about this in the passage we saw from his letter to Mesland of 
31 Frankfurt 1999, 79.
32 Appropriately clarified, that is. In the next section, I will discuss one way in which the notion of activity
may be entangled for some with a distinct notion, the notion of what is up to us.
33 Susan James gives a similar understanding of passivity: she says, “to qualify as passive, a kind of thought 
must presuppose that the soul is acted on in a certain way, either by the body or by the soul itself” (James
1997, 94). This understanding of passivity, of course, is not unique to Descartes but is consistent with a 











                                                 
  
May 2, 1644. He says, again using the wax example, “Just as it is not an activity but a 
passivity in the wax to take various shapes, so, it seems to me, it is a passivity in the soul 
to receive one or another idea” (AT IV 113; CSMK 232). He then elaborates on what acts 
on the mind:
[The soul] receives its ideas partly from objects which come into contact
with the senses, partly from impressions in the brain, and partly from prior 
dispositions of the soul and from movements of the will. (AT IV 114; 
CSMK 232)
We see here that material objects, the body, and the mind itself act on the mind and 
thereby produce ideas in it.  
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes discusses sense perception in particular, and 
this is the only place Descartes uses the term “passive” (passiva) in the Meditations:34 
Now there is in me a passive [passiva] faculty of sensory perception, that 
is, a faculty for receiving and recognizing the ideas of sensible objects; but 
I could not make use of it unless there was also an active [activa] faculty, 
either in me or in something else, which produced or brought about these 
ideas. (AT VII 79; CSM II 55)
Descartes here seems to tie the passivity of sense perception and its identity as the faculty 
that receives the ideas of sensible objects. Thus, his characterization aligns with his other 
examples of passivity of mind. 
I have argued that for Descartes, mental passivity involves the mind being acted 
on (either by material objects, the body or the mind itself). Due to being acted upon, it 
receives various kinds of ideas. I propose that mental activity, as the flip side of mental 
passivity, involves not being acted upon, but acting. This may look tautological until we 
flesh out what this might mean: in acting, rather than receiving something, the mind 
contributes something from itself that it did not receive from something else. The











formulations of action and passion that Descartes provides in the Passions of the Soul, 
support my characterizations of his notions. There he elaborates:
[The thoughts] I call [the soul’s] actions are all of our volitions, because 
we find by experience that they come directly from the soul and seem to 
depend only on it; as, on the other hand, all the sorts of cases of perception 
or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called its passions, 
because it is often not our soul that makes them such as they are, and 
because it always receives them from things that are represented by them. 
(AT XI 342; SV 28; CSM I 335)
The will, as the active faculty, contributes mental states—volitions—that come directly 
from the mind and seem to depend only on it, and thus, are states that it did not receive 
from something else. Although the Passions of the Soul was published eight years after 
the Meditations, I think his conception of activity and passivity at the time of the 
Meditations aligns with this formulation.
Understanding activity in this way helps to unify and make sense of Descartes’ 
examples of mental activity. In the next section, I will show that error and judgment, for 
Descartes, result from mental activity.
V. Error and judgment as activity
In this section, I will argue that understanding mental activity as I have presented it 
provides us with another way of thinking about the development of Descartes’ theory of 
judgment. In the Meditations, error and judgment are both attributed to the will because 
they result from mental activity, and the will is the active faculty. I will begin by showing 
that there is continuity in Descartes’ theory of error that is easily overlooked because of 
the differences in his terminology and project: error both in the Regulae and in the 
Meditations results from mental activity. I will then show how judgment likewise results 









                                                 
 
Error as activity 
As we saw in Section II of this chapter, error in the Regulae is always a result of a 
particular mental process by which we form our beliefs: we err only when we ourselves 
compose in some way the things we believe. In other words, error always requires mental 
activity. Descartes’ distinction between composite natures that we experience as 
composite and those that we ourselves compose helps illustrate the point. When we have 
knowledge of composite natures because we experience them, Descartes holds, recall:
The intellect can never be deceived by any experience if it considers 
precisely only the thing presented to it, according to whether it has it either 
in itself or in an image, and furthermore, does not judge that the 
imagination faithfully represents the objects of the senses, or that the 
senses take on the true shapes of things, or finally, that external things are 
not always such as they appear to be. (AT X 423)
As long as the intellect restricts itself to only what experience presents to it, we never err. 
It is when the intellect judges that the imagination faithfully represents the objects of the 
senses, that the senses take on the true shapes of things, and that external things are 
always such as they appear to be, that we err. In such cases, the intellect is contributing 
something to the thought that it does not receive from experience. In other words, the 
intellect is—we are—active in such cases. I think this is the force of Descartes’ locution 
“we ourselves compose [nos ipsi componimus]” (AT X 422, my emphasis) the composite 
natures. 
Understanding error in the Regulae as activity illuminates why necessary 
deduction is the only form of composition that does not produce error.35 As we saw, 
Descartes holds that as long as the intellect conjoins only things that have a necessary 











connection, error will not result. In necessary deduction, the intellect is not contributing 
something from itself that is not already in the simple natures themselves. In contrast, 
when the intellect conjoins things do not have a necessary connection, it is contributing 
something from itself—namely the connection, as there is not one that follows from the 
nature of the things themselves. 
As in the Regulae, error in the Meditations also requires mental activity. First, in 
the Fourth Meditation, Descartes says that as long as the mind is passive—as long as it 
simply receives ideas—we never err: 
All that the intellect does is enable me to perceive the ideas which are 
subjects for possible judgments; and regarded strictly in this light, it turns 
out to contain no error in the proper sense of that term. (AT VII 56; CSM 
II 39)
Ideas, what we receive when the mind is passive, are not the kind of thing that can ever 
be false. Descartes expresses the same sentiment in his Third Meditation discussion of 
error: 
The chief and most common mistake which is to be found here consists in 
my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things 
located outside me. Of course, if I considered just the ideas themselves 
simply as modes of my thought, without referring them to anything else, 
they could scarcely give me any material for error. (AT VII 37; CSM II 
26)
Ideas in themselves do not lead us to error. It is only when we add something to an 
idea—for instance, when we refer them to external objects—that we can err.
Thus, it is only when we are active that the possibility for error arises. Descartes 
sums up his explanation of error in the following way: 
The scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of 
restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do 







Note that Descartes’ summary brings out the activity involved when we err. Error occurs 
from our contribution, or use—we extend the will beyond the bounds of the intellect. 
According to the theodicean explanation, Descartes makes error (erroneous 
judgment) an operation of the will in order to vindicate God of the mistakes we make. 
But Descartes conceived of error, in effect, as a function of the will even before he had 
any theodicean concerns. What I mean is this: Descartes conceives of error in the 
Regulae, as he does in the Meditations, as resulting from mental activity. But only post-
Regulae does he develop his two-faculty psychology according to which the will is the 
activity of the mind and the intellect is its passivity. Thus, it is not until the Meditations 
that error is a function of the will. Since Descartes conceives of error as resulting from 
activity even before vindicating God is a concern, the theodicy of the Fourth Meditation, 
I suggest, need not have motivated Descartes to attribute error to the will. 
Judgment as activity
We can understand judgment, like error, as resulting from mental activity. According to 
Descartes, judgment requires more than what the intellect perceives, since the intellect 
simply provides the subject matter for judgment: recall his statement that “all that the 
intellect does is enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible 
judgments” (AT VII 56; CSM II 39). We form a judgment only when we contribute a 
mental attitude to the subject matter we have received. Descartes mentions affirmation 
and denial in the Fourth Meditation but in the Principles adds assertion, denial, and doubt 
to the list of mental attitudes (AT VIIIA 18; CSM I 204). We do not receive the mental 












contributes the mental attitude. Since judgment requires mental activity, and the will is 
the active faculty, Descartes attributes judgment to the will.
At this point, one might worry that characterizing judgment as resulting from 
activity is misleading, since in an important class of cases—cases of clear and distinct 
perception—the will looks passive in judgment.36 John Cottingham characterizes our 
assent in cases of clear and distinct perception “as [the] passive and involuntary response 
to the truth,”37 and Hiram Caton says, “when clear ideas supervene in the understanding 
the will is passive toward them; the will submits by assenting, as it must according to the 
necessity of its nature.”38 
I think this worry arises because the notions of activity and that of the will as the 
active faculty might be entangled with a distinct notion, that of the will as what is “up to 
us.” I have argued that, for Descartes, the will is active insofar as it contributes something 
that it did not receive from something else—in the case of judgment, mental attitudes like 
assent or denial. But activity, one might think, has the connotation of something being up 
to us in a robust sense—that we have full control over what we do, and that nothing but 
ourselves cause us to do what we do. Judgment in cases of clear and distinct perception is
not up to us in this robust sense: clear and distinct perception irresistibly compels us to 
judge in accordance with it. But this is no objection to the activity of judgment, since as I 
have argued, Descartes does not conceive of activity as being up to us in this robust 
36 Louis Loeb has raised this worry in conversation.  
37 Cottingham 2002, 359, note 43. John Cottingham, though, does allow for activity in the process of  
inquiry: the full quote is “assent as passive and involuntary response to the truth occurs within a context of  
active inquiry whose conditions of operation are subject to voluntary control.”







                                                 
 
     
 
      
 
sense. Even though we are caused, indeed compelled, by clear and distinct perception— 
the mental attitude we contribute comes from us, and we are thus active in judging.39 
VI. Conclusion
I have argued that the commonly held explanation of Descartes’ theory of judgment does 
not recognize significant philosophical commitments that might have figured into the 
development of Descartes view that judgment is an operation of the will. Yet I want to 
end with a caveat: I want to emphasize that my argument does not deny that Descartes 
situates his discussion of judgment in a theodicy or that the theory of judgment, as 
Descartes presents it, plays a role in the theodicy of the Fourth Meditation. I am 
suggesting, however, that it is not the pressures of the theodicy per se that lead to 
Descartes’ theory of judgment of the Meditations. Instead, I have suggested that 
Descartes’ views on error and activity are important factors in the development of the 
resulting theory of judgment. Of course, Descartes’ theory of error in the Meditations is 
intertwined with his theodicean project, but it can be thought of as having an emphasis 
distinct from that of the theodicean project. This conceptual separation of the theory of 
error from the theodicy is important because in the Regulae, Descartes holds a theory of 
error but has no theodicean aims.
39 The notion of activity, as I have characterized it, may then be akin to the Stoic notion of something
depending on us. Susanne Bobzien argues that the concept of that which depends on us for some Stoics 
doesn’t require any indeterminist freedom to do otherwise. Instead, what makes things depend on us is that 
they result from an act of assent, which depends on us not in the sense of being undetermined, but in the 












                                                 
  
                  
  
                    
       
              
 
   
 
      
Chapter 2
Human Freedom in the Fourth Meditation
Introduction
Throughout his corpus, Descartes asserts in no uncertain terms that human beings are 
free.1 The nature of this freedom, however, is notoriously unclear. The elusiveness of 
Descartes’ conception of human freedom2 begins with the definition he provides in the 
Fourth Meditation of the “the will or freedom of choice [voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas],” 
which: 
Simply consists in our ability to do or not to do something (that is, to 
affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact 
that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or 
for pursuit or avoidance, we move in such a manner that we feel that we 
are determined to it by no external force. (AT VII 57)3 
This passage poses multiple problems of translation and interpretation, which I will 
discuss later. For now, let us note simply that, as many commentators have suggested,4 
Descartes seems to introduce two distinct, and potentially conflicting, notions of 
1  For example, in the Meditations (1641), he says, “I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice  
which I received from God is not sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not  
restricted in any way” (AT VII 56; CSM II 39); in the Principles (1644), “that there is freedom in our  
will…is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us”  
(AT VIIIA 19; CSM I 205); and in The Passions of the Soul (1649), “the will is by its nature free in such a  
way that it can never be constrained” (AT XI 359; SV 41; CSM I 343).
2  From this point on, I will refer to ‘human freedom’ simply as ‘freedom’, unless otherwise specified.  
3  My translation of the second clause of the definition differs from Cottingham’s in CSM II. See more on  
the differences in note 14, below.
4  The interpretive tradition follows Gilson 1913 and Kenny 1972. For example, see Beyssade 1994,  









                                                 
  
        
      




freedom: liberty of indifference with the first clause, and liberty of spontaneity, with the 
second. Liberty of indifference is a two-way power that is undetermined, whereas liberty 
of spontaneity is compatible with determinism. A challenge that thus emerges from 
Descartes’ definition is to understand the relation between the two notions of freedom 
and to figure out which notion expresses his considered position (if either).
Possibly because the definition seems to refer to two notions of freedom that 
differ regarding their compatibility with determinism,5 commentators have focused on 
understanding how Descartes conceives of freedom’s relation to determinism. They have 
variously argued that Descartes was a compatibilist;6 that he was an incompatibilist;7 and 
more specifically, that he was a libertarian.8 
Yet in addition to the definition, in the Fourth Meditation Descartes introduces 
several important features of freedom that seem mysterious if we approach them from the 
perspective of understanding Descartes’ view on the relationship between freedom and 
determinism. In the so-called “great light” passage (AT VII 58-59; CSM II 41), Descartes 
asserts that agents are free even when they cannot but judge in accordance with clear and 
distinct perception:
I could not but judge that what I understood so clearly was true; but this 
was not because I was compelled [coactus] so to judge by any external 
force, but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great 
inclination in the will, and thus the spontaneity and freedom of my belief 
was all the greater in proportion to my lack of indifference. (AT VII 58-
59; CSM II 41)
5  Another possible reason is that many philosophers of the early modern period seem to frame their  
discussions of freedom in this way. See Sleigh et. al. 1998 for discussion of Descartes, Hobbes,
Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke and Leibniz on determinism and human freedom.
6 Curley 1975, 165-166; Loeb 1981, 143-149; Cottingham 1986, 149-151; and Hatfield 2003,
192-196.
7  Newman 2008, 346-351.  







                                                 
 
 
     
         
 
   
    
 Furthermore, freedom, he specifies, bears a relation to the inclination of the will. And, he 
says, “indifference” is “the lowest grade of freedom” (AT VII 58; CSM II 40).
To make sense of these features of freedom in particular and Descartes’ 
conception of freedom in the Fourth Meditation in general, I suggest an alternative 
approach: to begin with Descartes’ conception of the human will.9 In this chapter, I 
discuss three aspects of the will—its indifference (a state of the will), its unlimited scope, 
and its tendency towards the good and the true. I show that these aspects of the will shape 
Descartes’ conception of freedom, and that we cannot fully make sense of his conception 
of freedom without understanding his conception of the will. 
Although commentators have not focused on the connections between Descartes’ 
conception of the will and his conception of freedom, that there are such connections 
should come as no real surprise, since Descartes identifies the will with freedom, and 
interchanges the terms ‘will’ (voluntas), ‘faculty of choosing,’ (facultas eligendi),10 and 
‘freedom of choice’ (arbitrii libertas).11 
My exploration of Descartes’ conception of the will yields an interpretation of the 
Fourth Meditation definition: the definition, I argue, asserts that freedom consists in our 
power to determine ourselves. Yet interpreting freedom as consisting in this power 
cannot account for the other features of freedom Descartes presents in the Fourth 
Meditation. I argue that Descartes needs another condition and that there is one available 
to him: freedom is proportional to the ease of self-determination. This condition, 
9 From this point on, I will refer to ‘human will’ simply as ‘will’, unless otherwise specified.
10 Descartes’ use of the Latin ‘facultas eligendi’ is insufficient to answer the question of whether he holds  
that the will has the two-way power of choice at issue—‘eligere’ may also be translated ‘to elect.’ Michelle  
Beyssade notes in support of this point that Duc de Luynes, in his French translation of the Meditations,  
translated ‘facultas eligendi’ as ‘puissance d’élire’ (‘power to elect’ or ‘power to embrace’) (Beyssade  
1994, 196-197).














                                                 
 
 
         
                  
combined with the conception of the will I have laid out, provides a unified account of 
Descartes’ characterization of freedom in the Fourth Meditation. 
I. The Challenges
I begin by fleshing out in further detail the main challenges for understanding Descartes’ 
conception of freedom in the Fourth Meditation. Two central challenges arise from 
Descartes’ definition of the will or freedom of choice. The first challenge is to identify 
the extensions of the two clauses of the definition. Most commentators take the clauses to 
map onto positions that would have been familiar to Descartes.12 In the first clause of the 
definition, Descartes says:
[The will or freedom of choice] simply consists in our ability to do or not 
to do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid). (AT VII
57; CSM II 40) 
Commentators have associated this first clause with liberty of indifference, which 
understands freedom as consisting in a two-way power that is undetermined.  Suárez 
gives a classic formulation of this conception of freedom in his Metaphysical 
Disputations: “A free cause is one which, given that all the things required for acting 
have been posited, is able to act and able not to act.”13 
The second clause of the definition differs from the first: 
Or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts 
something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, 
we move in such a manner that we feel that we are determined to it by no 
external force. (AT VII 57)14 
12 See note 4, above.
13 Suarez 1994, 314.
14 John Cottingham translates this passage: “or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect 
puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that








                                                 
 
     
        
     
      
      
   
        
  
   
    
 
     
      
             
   
     
Commentators have identified this second clause with liberty of spontaneity, which 
involves the absence of coercion or constraint, but also the idea that the agent is 
contributing to her own activity in some way.15 
The two clauses of the definition do indeed resemble the notions of liberty of 
indifference and liberty of spontaneity. Yet each of the clauses slightly diverges from the 
notion of freedom with which it has been associated. In contrast with liberty of 
indifference, the first clause can be understood in a way that is consistent with 
determinism, provided that we understand what it means to have a two-way power with a 
hypothetical analysis. Joseph Keim Campbell, for instance, suggests that the proper way 
to understand the ability to do or not do invoked in the first clause is with the following 
general form: a person S has the ability to do or not do if and only if “S could have done 
otherwise,” where this simply means that “S would have done otherwise if X,” where X 
is some condition or set of conditions.16 
id quod nobis ab intellectu proponitur affirmandum vel negandum, sive prosequendum vel fugiendum, ita
feramur, ut a nulla vi externa nos ad id determinari sentiamus.”
There are two significant differences between my translation and Cottingham’s. First, I translate
‘feramur’ with its active sense, following Michelle Beyssade (Beyssade 1994, 202), as “we move or go” 
rather than Cottingham’s “our inclinations,” which seems to draw on the passive sense of ‘feramur’—“we 
are carried.” This brings out what I mention is the second aspect of liberty of spontaneity, the idea that the 
agent is contributing to her activity. Second, my translation of “ut a nulla vi externa nos ad id determinari
sentiamus” literally as ‘we feel that we are determined to it by no external force’ suggests that we feel the 
absence of external force, whereas Cottingham’s translation (“we do not feel”) suggests a lack of awareness 
or knowledge of any such force. I will show the import of this difference in Section V of this chapter.
15 Commentators have variously focused on one or another of these aspects of liberty of spontaneity. For 
instance, Tad Schmaltz focuses on the absence of coercion: he characterizes liberty of spontaneity as 
simply “the absence of coercion” (Schmaltz 1996, 208). He is in good company: Hume characterizes 
liberty of spontaneity as “that which is oppos’d to violence” (Treatise, II.iii.2). In contrast, Anthony Kenny
focuses on the agent’s contribution: liberty of spontaneity is “liberty defined in terms of wanting,” (Kenny 
1972, 17). Vere Chappell captures both of these components—he says, “an action is spontaneous if it is 
performed by its agent entirely on his own, without being forced or helped or affected by any external 
factor, or by anything other than his very self” (Chappell 1994, 180).
16 Joseph Keim Campbell takes the specific form of the hypothetical analysis to be: “S could have done 
otherwise only if (1) S would have done otherwise if S had different reasons and (2) S would have had 






   
                                                 
 
 
     
      
       
     
The second clause specifies that the will, or freedom of choice, consists in acting 
with the feeling of the absence of external force rather than the absence of external force 
itself. But liberty of spontaneity requires the absence of external force itself. Descartes’ 
formulation of the second clause leaves open the possibility that our actions may in fact 
be externally determined although we feel that they are not.
A further question arises from the Fourth Meditation definition—the significance 
of the ‘or rather’ (vel potius) that joins the two clauses. If we accept that the two clauses 
refer to two distinct notions of freedom, it is unclear how we should understand the 
relationship between the two. Some have suggested that ‘or rather’ should be taken to 
withdraw completely what precedes it, where what precedes it has been taken to be 
liberty of indifference—and, thus, that freedom consists in liberty of spontaneity alone.17 
Others understand ‘or rather’ as further developing or clarifying what precedes it—and, 
thus, that the second clause should be understood as a further development of liberty of 
indifference.18 
In addition to the definition, Descartes presents other features of freedom in the 
Fourth Meditation that need to be accounted for in any interpretation. I will focus on 
three central seemingly disconnected features of freedom. First, Descartes holds not only 
that agents are free even when they cannot but judge in accordance with clear and distinct 
perception, but that they are most free in such a case.19 As we saw in the great light 
passage, Descartes asserts of the cogito that he could not but judge that it was true and yet 
17 See Beyssade 1994, 206, and Kenny 1972, 18 for discussion of this issue.  
18 C. P. Ragland, for example, says “‘or rather’ means ‘in other (better) words’”(Ragland 2006a, 390). 
19 We can infer this from Descartes’ view that freedom is inversely proportional to indifference, but  
Descartes makes this point explicitly in the Sixth Replies: “indifference does not belong to the essence of  
human freedom, since not only are we free when ignorance of what is right makes us indifferent, but we are  
also free—indeed at our freest—when a clear perception impels us to pursue some object” (AT VII 433;  
















                                                 
              
“the spontaneity and freedom of [his] belief was all the greater in proportion to [his] lack 
of indifference” (AT VII 58-59; CSM II 41). Thus, an adequate interpretation must 
explain not only why freedom is compatible with the inability to judge contrary to what is 
clearly and distinctly perceived, but why these cases are paradigmatic cases of freedom.
Second, Descartes holds that freedom is proportional to the inclination of the will:
The more I incline in one direction – either because I clearly understand 
that reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because God so 
disposes my inmost thoughts – the more freely I choose that way. Neither 
divine grace nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the 
contrary, they increase and strengthen it. (AT VII 57-58)
An adequate interpretation must explain why freedom, for Descartes, is not an all-or-
nothing matter, but comes in degrees and is proportional to the inclination of the will.
Lastly, Descartes holds that “indifference” is “the lowest grade of freedom”:
The indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one 
direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence 
not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in knowledge or a 
kind of negation. (AT VII 58; CSM II 40)
An adequate interpretation must explain what this indifference is and how the freedom in 
cases of indifference is a defect or negation. This indifference is an aspect of the will 
distinct from the notion of liberty of indifference I have discussed. Thus to understand 
Descartes’ claim that indifference is the lowest grade of freedom, we need to understand 
his conception of indifference as a state of the will. I now turn to this feature of the will. 
II. Indifference as a state of the will
Descartes introduces an idiosyncratic20 notion of indifference (indifferentia) in his Fourth 
Meditation discussion of freedom. This notion has not been discussed much in the 
20 Descartes provides a possible clue as to the origins of his usage—in his letter, possibly to Mesland, 












                                                 
       
 
     
      
                   
         
    
      
         
     




secondary literature,21 but I will spend some time exploring it since it plays an important 
role in Descartes’ conception of freedom, or so I will argue. Descartes explicitly clarifies 
this notion of indifference in a later letter to Mesland (February 9, 1645):
I would like you to notice that ‘indifference’ in this context seems to me 
strictly to mean that state of the will when it is not impelled one way 
rather than another by any perception of truth or goodness. (AT IV 173; 
CSMK 244-245)
The notion of indifference on which I am focusing here is distinct from the notion of 
liberty of indifference I discussed above: liberty of indifference is a conception of 
freedom, whereas indifference, as Descartes uses it in the Fourth Meditation, is a “state of 
the will.” 
Whether the will is in this state or not is tied to whether or not we clearly and 
distinctly perceive something as true or good. Descartes holds that we are never 
indifferent when we clearly and distinctly perceive something as true or good. In other 
words, clear and distinct perception precludes indifference: 
If I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to 
deliberate about the right judgement or choice; in that case, although I 
should be wholly free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state 
of indifference. (AT VII 57-58; CSM II 40)
of indifference with it (AT IV 174; CSMK 245). Since ‘adiaphora’ is commonly translated as ‘indifferent,’
it is plausible that Descartes is adapting the Stoic notion for his own purposes. Sextus Empiricus
characterizes indifference thus: “They say that that which is indifferent is spoken of in three ways. In one 
sense, it is that neither towards which nor away from which an impulse arises, for instance, the question of 
whether the number of stars or the number of hairs on one’s head is even. In another sense it is that towards 
or away from which an impulse arises, but not more towards this rather than that, for example, two 
indistinguishable four-drachma coins, whenever one has to choose one of them. For an impulse to choosing 
one of them does indeed arise, but no more towards this one than that one. In the third sense they say that
“indifferent’ is what contributes neither to happiness nor unhappiness, as health or wealth. For that which is 
sometimes used well and sometimes badly is, they say, indifferent” (Inwood and Gerson 1997, 389). The 
Stoics’ first two senses of indifference seem to have analogs in Descartes’ notion of indifference—the cases
of when we have no reasons to go one way rather than another, and when the reasons on both sides are 
balanced, as I will show.  









                                                 
 
 
Alternatively, in any case in which we do not clearly and distinctly perceive something as 
true or good, we are indifferent: 
This indifference does not merely apply to cases where the intellect is 
wholly ignorant, but extends in general to every case where the intellect 
does not have sufficiently clear knowledge at the time when the will 
deliberates. (AT VII 59; CSM II 41) 
Thus, we see that indifference and the absence of clear and distinct perception go hand-
in-hand.
Descartes explicitly includes several different kinds of cases in which we do not 
clearly and distinctly perceive something as true or good. These cases vary in regards to 
the number and strength of our reasons for choice. Descartes can account for this 
variation: he suggests in a later letter (dated May 2,1644), possibly to Mesland, that 
indifference comes in degrees and is inversely proportional to the number of reasons that 
push us in one direction rather than another:22 
I beg you observe that I did not say that a person was indifferent only if he 
lacked knowledge, but rather, that he is more indifferent the fewer reasons 
he knows which push him to choose one side rather than another. (AT IV 
115)
Here, and in the previously quoted passage, he implies that the case in which we have no 
reasons to go one way rather than another is a case of indifference—when we are “wholly 
ignorant” and when we “lack knowledge.” Furthermore, cases in which we have reasons 
on both sides that are balanced presumably also count as cases of indifference: they 
would seem to be the natural interpretation of one of Descartes’ characterizations of 
22 Thus, on this characterization it would seem that we are equally indifferent whether we have no reasons








                                                 
           
     
      
 
 
indifference in the Fourth Meditation—“the indifference I feel when no reason impels me 
in one direction rather than another” (AT VII 58).23
 Descartes also includes cases from the other end of the range in another 
characterization of indifference—cases in which we have multiple reasons that point one 
way. Descartes’ inclusion of these cases may seem surprising to us, since they diverge 
from our intuitive understanding of indifference. He explains why even these count as 
cases of indifference:
For although probable conjectures may pull me in one direction, the mere 
knowledge that they are simply conjectures, and not certain and 
indubitable reasons [non…certae atque indubitabiles rationes], is itself 
quite enough to push my assent the other way. (AT VII 59; CSM II 41)24 
Thus, indifference, for Descartes, covers cases in which we have no reasons to go one 
way rather than another; cases in which the reasons on both sides are balanced; and cases 
in which the reasons point one way but are not certain and indubitable. The analysis of 
indifference I have presented explains why Descartes characterizes indifference as 
“evidence…of a defect in knowledge or a kind of negation” (AT VII 58; CSM II 40): all 
of these cases are ones in which we lack clear and distinct perception. 
At this point, it is worth comparing Descartes’ conception of the indifference of 
the human will and his conception of divine indifference. Both the indifference of the 
human will and the indifference of the divine will consist in the will’s not being impelled 
one way rather than another by any perception of truth or goodness. Yet human 
indifference and divine difference also differ significantly: human indifference is a defect 
23 Roger Ariew et. al. (Ariew et. al. 2003, 106-107) understand the indifference of the will solely this way,  
as a “balance of reasons.” Vere Chappell (Chappell 1994, 181) and Dan Kaufman, following Chappell  
(Kaufman 2003, 395), accept an additional condition under which the will is indifferent—when an agent  
has no reasons to go one way.








since we are indifferent only when we lack clear and distinct perception, whereas divine 
indifference is essential to the divine will and a perfection. It is important to show how 
the indifference of the human will and that of the divine will differ, since holding that 
human indifference and divine indifference are the same could lead one to mistakenly 
hold that the freedom that follows is likewise the same. In other words, one might then 
mistakenly hold that the freedom the human will has when indifferent is a God-like 
undetermined two-way power of choice. I will argue in the next section that this is not 
what Descartes holds.
The divine will is essentially indifferent because of two aspects of the divine 
nature: its omnipotence and the lack of distinction between the divine will and the divine 
intellect. Descartes holds that “the supreme indifference to be found in God is the 
supreme indication of his omnipotence” (AT VII 432; CSM II 292). God is not 
determined by anything outside of himself to will as he does:
It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent 
from eternity with respect to everything which has happened or will ever 
happen; for it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the 
divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, 
prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so. I am not speaking 
here of temporal priority: I mean that there is not even any priority of 
order, or nature, or of ‘rationally determined reason’ as they call it, such 
that God’s idea of the good impelled him to choose one thing rather than 
another. (AT VII 431-432; CSM II 291)
Since God’s omnipotence means, for Descartes, that God himself determines the good 
and the true, nothing outside himself can impel him to choose one way rather than 
another. Second, for God, unlike for humans, there is no distinction between the will and 
the understanding: “in God willing and knowing are a single thing in such a way that by 
the very fact of willing something he knows it and it is only for this reason that such a 










                                                 
  
    
 
  
ours—Descartes holds that the human will and the human intellect are two distinct 
faculties with two distinct natures and functions.25 But in God, because willing and 
knowing are identical, it is by God’s willing it so that something is true or good. Thus, it 
can never be the case that God wills something because it is true or good, and therefore, 
the divine will is essentially indifferent. 
A second point of difference between human indifference and divine indifference 
has to do with the nature of indifference itself. Human indifference, I have argued, comes 
in degrees, and is inversely proportional to the number and the strength of the reasons we 
have to go one way. We are, by this understanding, most indifferent when we happen to 
have no reasons to go one way rather than another.26 This, however, is just one end of the 
spectrum of indifference. Divine indifference, in contrast, always entails that God has no 
reasons to go one way rather than another, since because of the divine nature there cannot 
be any reasons that impel God one way rather than another.
III. The unlimited scope of the will
I now turn to a second feature of the human will that plays an important role in 
Descartes’ conception of freedom—the unlimited scope of the will. I seek to show that it 
is because the scope of the will is unlimited that we can act without the determination of 
reason—that is, whenever any of the conditions of indifference I’ve outlined in the 
previous section have been met. 
25 As I discussed in Chapter 1, Descartes holds that the intellect and the will are fundamentally different:
“understanding is the passivity of the mind and willing is its activity” (AT III 372; CSMK 182).








                                                 
 
      
       
  
In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes distinguishes his two mental faculties, the 
intellect and the will, in terms of their scope. The intellect, he says, is “extremely slight 
and finite,” whereas the will “I know by experience…is not restricted in any way [sane 
nullis illam limitibus circumscribi experior]” (AT VII 57; CSM II 39). This disparity in 
the scope of the faculties is central to Descartes’ vindication of God for our mistakes in 
judgment. Descartes holds, of course, that error results when we misuse the will and 
extend it beyond what we clearly and distinctly perceive (AT VII 58; CSM II 41). But the 
will’s scope need not be unlimited for Descartes’ explanation of error and vindication of 
God to hold; the scope of the will need simply be greater than that of the intellect.
I will argue that Descartes holds that the will’s scope is unlimited because it is in 
this way that humans bear the image and likeness of God: our will is analogous to God’s 
will because its scope is unlimited, like God’s. It is important to get clear on the 
significance of Descartes’ analogy between God and humans, since the analogy has 
played a key role in recent interpretations of Descartes as a libertarian: these 
interpretations suggest that humans bear the image and likeness of God by possessing an 
undetermined two-way power.27 Thus, by providing an alternative understanding of the 
analogy—in terms of the will’s unlimited scope—I undercut a significant motivation for
interpreting Descartes as holding that human freedom consists in such an undetermined 
two-way power.
Descartes presents this analogy between the human will and the divine will 
immediately prior to his definition in the Fourth Meditation: “it is above all in virtue of 
27 Lilli Alanen, for example, implies that the analogy should be understood in terms of the human will’s
“power to do otherwise that is in some sense undetermined” (Alanen 2003, 231) and C. P. Ragland 
identifies a libertarian two-way power as what is common to the human will and the divine will (Ragland








                                                 
  
   
    
                    
 
  
     
 
 
the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God” 
(AT VII 57; CSM II 40). This is because the divine will “does not seem any greater than 
mine when viewed formally and precisely in itself [in se formaliter et præcise spectata]” 
(AT VII 57). It is unclear how we are to understand the phrase “will viewed formally and 
precisely in itself,” and thus the analogy between the divine will and the human will.
In two later texts, however, Descartes suggests that it is because of the unlimited 
scope of the will that we bear the divine image. In the Principles, Descartes reiterates his 
explanation of error of the Fourth Meditation and explains in what sense the will is 
infinite: 
The scope of the will is wider than the intellect, and this is the cause of 
error. Moreover, the perception of the intellect extends only to the few 
objects presented to it, and is always extremely limited. The will, on the 
other hand, can in a certain sense be called infinite, since we observe 
without exception that its scope extends to anything that can possibly be 
an object of any other will—even the immeasurable will of God. (AT 
VIIIA 18; CSM I 204)
Here, Descartes explicitly connects the intellect’s finitude and the will’s infinitude with 
their scopes.28 The intellect’s scope is “extremely limited” in the sense that the intellect 
extends only to what we actually perceive. In contrast, the will’s scope is infinite in a 
certain sense: it extends beyond what we actually will to any possible object of any will. 
Notice the scope of the faculties differ in two respects. First, the intellect’s scope is 
limited to the actual, whereas the will’s scope extends to possible objects. Second, the 
28 Pace Martial Gueroult, who suggests that Descartes has three different conceptions of the infinity of the
human will: 1) “the capacity to apply oneself actually to all possible objects,” 2) “infinite aspiration toward 
something else that man does not have” and 3) “absoluteness: the absolute decisive power of yes or no,
which is an indivisible ‘freedom of free will…which consists only in that we can do a given thing or not do
it, that is, in that we can affirm or deny it’” (Gueroult 1984, 232). As I discuss, I think that Descartes has a
single conception of the infinity of the human will, which I understand similarly to Gueroult’s 1). As for his 
other suggestions, 2) can be understood in terms of 1) and 3) is not a conception that Descartes introduces 













                                                 
  
             
      
 
   
   
 
intellect’s scope is limited to what we perceive, whereas the will’s scope extends beyond 
us to any possible object of any will—including God’s.  
Descartes makes similar remarks in a letter to Mersenne, dated December 25, 
1639: 
The desire that everyone has to possess every perfection he can 
conceive of, and consequently all the perfections which we believe to be 
in God, is due to the fact that God has given us a will which has no limits
[Dieu nous a donné une volonté qui n’a point de bornes]. It is principally 
because of this will within us that we can say we are created in his image.
(AT II 628; CSMK 141-142)
Since desire is an operation of the will,29 Descartes here connects the will’s lack of limits 
to our ability to will anything we can conceive. And it is in virtue of this unlimited will 
that we bear the image of God.
At this point, I would like to head off a possible objection to Descartes’ view that 
we can will anything we can conceive. Descartes does not mean that we can achieve 
anything we can conceive. Thus it is not an objection to Descartes’ view that we cannot 
simply, by mental fiat, make some conceivable state of affairs come to pass—for 
example, that we cannot jump over the moon. Rather, we must recall that Descartes 
conceives of there being many kinds of willing, or what he calls “modes.”30 He presents 
some of these modes of the will in the Fourth Meditation: affirmation, denial, pursuit, and 
avoidance. He adds to this list in the Principles: desire, aversion, assertion, and doubt 
(AT VII 17; CSM I 204). For the will to have unlimited scope means simply that for any 
29 At this point in his thinking anyway. In the Principles, he classifies desire as a mode of willing (AT
VIIIA 17; CSM I 204). By the time of The Passions of the Soul, Descartes includes desire in his list of
primitive passions. See Chapter 3, Section 1, for discussion of Descartes’ conception of the primitive 
passion of desire.
30 It is an interesting question what makes Descartes’ various kinds of willing a unified class. Rosenthal 
1986 discusses several commonalities between what he calls cognitive and conative attitudes. My 
discussion in chapter 1 of mental activity provides a different line of thinking: they are all contributions of









                                                 
 
   
 
                    
 
    
conceivable thing, it is the possible object of at least one mode of willing, not every mode 
of willing. That we jump over the moon could be the object of several modes of 
willing—desire, aversion, denial, and doubt, for instance.
It may seem that there is a disanalogy here—the human will is limited by what we 
can conceive but the divine will is not. There is no disanalogy—the finitude of our minds 
should be understood in terms of the intellect, rather than the will. Descartes says that
“[God’s] power is beyond our grasp. In general we can assert that God can do everything 
that is within our grasp but not that he cannot do what is beyond our grasp. It would be 
rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as his power” (AT I 146; CSMK 23). He 
thus affirms that conceivability is not tied to the will, but rather, stems from the cognitive 
faculties—here, the imagination. Thus, this fact that we can only will what we can 
conceive does not show that the will is limited, but rather, that the intellect is, as the 
faculty that presents ideas to the will.31 
The unlimited scope of the will allows us to assent to or pursue things that we do 
not clearly and distinctly perceive as true or good—that is, it allows us to choose when 
the will is indifferent. Descartes thus conceives of the will differently from those who 
hold that if the intellect doesn’t provide any reasons to go one way rather than another, 
the will cannot simply choose.32 Gassendi raises an objection of this sort in the Fifth 
Objections:
31 And this, Descartes holds, gives us “no cause for complaint” (AT VII 60; CSM II 42), since it follows
from our nature as created, finite creatures.
32 See, for example, Aquinas, who holds that “an appetitive power is a passive power that is naturally
moved by what is apprehended” (Freddoso, ST Ia.80.2c) and “it is in this way that the intellect is prior to
the will—as a mover is prior to what is moved, and as what is active is prior to what is passive. For it is the









                                                 
  
         
 
   
       
  
When you suppose that you have not yet come upon any persuasive reason 
in favour of one alternative rather than the other, this is indeed a possible 
supposition. But you ought simultaneously to suppose that in that case no 
judgement will follow, and that your will will always be indifferent and 
will not decide to make a definite judgment until the intellect comes upon 
some plausible argument which favours one side more than another. (AT 
VII 316; CSM II 220)
Gassendi objects that Descartes is wrong to suggest that the will can judge when we have 
either no reasons to go one way rather than another or when the reasons on both sides are 
balanced. In his response to Gassendi, Descartes seems to indicate that he holds that “the 
will has the freedom to direct itself, without the determination of the intellect, towards 
one side or the other” (AT VII 378; CSM II 260).33 This ability to act without the 
determination of the intellect constitutes a kind of freedom of choice, albeit a lesser kind, 
for Descartes. I will return to this point shortly.
IV. The will’s tendency towards the good and the true
There is one last feature of the will I will discuss: Descartes’ conception of the will as 
tending towards the good and the true. In the Sixth Replies, Descartes mentions this 
feature of the human will: “[man] finds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already 
determined by God, and his will cannot tend towards anything else” (AT VII 166; CSM 
II 117). By this, Descartes means that the will has a natural orientation towards the true 
and the good.34 It does not tend towards things that have no appearance of truth or 
goodness. Furthermore, the will as given to us by God certainly does not tend towards 
falsity, for then God would be a deceiver (AT VIIIA 21; CSM I 207). 
33 Descartes adopts a rhetorical style in his replies to Gassendi on this issue, so he doesn’t straightforwardly
assert his own view. But it is clear from the context that this is his position.
34 Although Descartes rejects appeal to final causes in his natural philosophy, he does help himself to
teleological notions when describing human mental faculties, e.g. in the Sixth Meditation he describes the 
“proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given me by nature” (AT VII 83; CSM II 57). For more on 











                                                 
   
  
  
    
The will’s orientation towards the true and the good does not mean that it is only 
when we clearly and distinctly perceive something as true or good that the will is inclined 
to it. Descartes holds in the Fourth Meditation that the will inclines to various degrees in 
response to the clarity and distinctness of the perception the intellect presents to it. In The 
Passions of the Soul, Descartes develops this idea: “the will is inclined only to things 
which have some appearance of goodness” (AT XI 464; SV 117). He here implicitly 
distinguishes between things being true or good and things merely seeming true or good 
in some way. The will may be inclined towards things that seem to be true or good even 
though they are not true or good—for instance, confused and obscure perceptions of 
various sorts, including the passions of the soul.
Descartes holds, further, that we cannot choose the false or the bad as such:35 
Now that we know that all our errors depend on the will [voluntate], it 
may seem surprising that we should ever go wrong, since there is no one 
who wants to go wrong [quia nemo est velit falli]. But there is a great 
difference between choosing to go wrong [velle falli] and choosing to give 
one’s assent [velle assentiri] in matters where, as it happens, error is to be 
found. And although there is in fact no one who expressly wishes to go 
wrong [expresse velit falli], there is scarcely anyone who does not often 
wish to give his assent [velit…assentiri] to something which, though he 
does not know it, contains some error. Indeed, precisely because of their 
eagerness to find the truth, people who do not know the right method of 
finding it often pass judgement on things of which they lack perception, 
and this is why they fall into error. (AT VIIIA 20-21; CSM I 206-207)36 
We can only choose the false or the bad when we do not clearly and distinctly perceive it 
to be false or bad, and we see it in some sense as true or good.
35 Pace the interesting case made by Stocker 1979.  
36 The Latin forms of the verb volo, translated alternately by John Cottingham as “wants,” “choosing,” and  
“wishes,” indicate that Descartes has in mind operations of the will. This is why Descartes sees a tension  







One might worry that the will’s determination to judge in accordance with clear 
and distinct perception constitutes a restriction on or limitation of the will, and Descartes 
says, as we saw in the previous section, “I know by experience that [the will] is not 
restricted in any way” (AT VII 57; CSM II 39). Understanding this determination in the 
context of the will’s tendency towards the true and the good provides a likely solution: 
the will’s tendency towards the true and the good is part of its nature and a perfection of 
the will. When the will cannot but judge in accordance with clear and distinct perception, 
it is, in fact, operating properly—in accordance with its natural tendency towards the true 
and the good. It is not a restriction on the will to act in accordance with its nature.
V. Cartesian Freedom in the Fourth Meditation
I have argued that because of a perfection of the will—its unlimited scope—the will has 
the ability to act even when it is indifferent, that is, even when we do not clearly and 
distinctly perceive something as good or true. But, as Descartes makes clear to Gassendi 
in the Fifth Replies, this ability is also a consequence of the nature of the intellect. If “the 
intellect were ever to determine the will to embrace what is false,” then “the intellect 
[would be] apprehending falsity under the guise of truth,” which would be a “total 
contradiction (AT VII 378; CSM II 260). Instead, as Descartes clarifies earlier in the 
Fifth Replies, the will determines itself in cases of indifference: “if [the will] is 
determined by itself, then it can after all be directed towards an object which the intellect 
does not impel it towards—which you denied, and which is the sole point in dispute” (AT 









                                                 
           
          
       
has the freedom to direct itself, without the determination of the intellect, towards one 
side or the other” (AT VII 378; CSM II 260).
The Fourth Meditation Definition
I think this interchange with Gassendi—together with our understanding of Descartes’ 
conception of the will—helps illuminate the definition of the will with which we began. 
Recall the Fourth Meditation definition: 
[The will, or freedom of choice] simply consists in our ability to do or not 
to do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it 
consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward 
for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, we move in such a 
manner that we feel that we are determined to it by no external force. (AT 
VII 57)
In the first clause of the definition, Descartes, I posit, is referring to the same power of 
the will to determine itself that he mentions in his response to Gassendi. Yet the will’s 
power to determine itself is not liberty of indifference, a two-way power that is 
undetermined. Descartes makes this clear in a letter dated May 2, 1644, possibly to 
Mesland, in which he clarifies his view from the Fourth Meditation that “if we see very 
clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difficult—and, on my view, impossible, as 
long as one continues in the same thought—to stop the course of our desire” (AT IV 116; 
CSMK 233, my emphasis) but also maintains that the will has “a real and positive power 
to determine [itself]” (AT IV 116; CSMK 234).37 If the will has the power to determine 
itself even when we cannot but judge in accordance with clear and distinct perception, 
37 Descartes’ full response is: “Ainsi, puisque vous ne mettez pas la liberté dans l'indifférence précisément,
mais dans une puissance réelle et positive de se déterminer, il n'y a de différence entre nos opinions que









                                                 
 
 
     
 
this power cannot be liberty of indifference, for in cases of clear and distinct perception, 
we lack the option to not assent and we aren’t undetermined.
In that letter of 1644, Descartes suggests that the will always has this power to 
determine itself—both when it is indifferent and when it is not:
I do not see that it makes any difference to that power whether it is 
accompanied by indifference, which you agree is an imperfection, or 
whether it is not so accompanied, when there is nothing in the intellect 
except light, as in the case of the blessed, who are confirmed in grace. (AT 
IV 116; CSMK 234)
But what is this power of the will to determine itself, if not an undetermined two-way 
power of choice? It is the power of the will to generate volitions—cognitive and conative 
attitudes.38 It is the ability, as Descartes says, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid. The 
will always has this ability, regardless of whether it is indifferent or not. When we are 
indifferent, the will’s power to determine itself is two-way: we can either assent or not 
assent. When we perceive something clearly and distinctly, the will’s power to determine 
itself is one-way, as it cannot not assent. In both cases, however, the will has the ability to 
determine itself—that is, to generate volitions. 
Descartes’ affirmation that the will always has the power to generate mental states 
proper to it might strike some as trivial—especially if characterized simply as the view 
that the will always has the power to will.39 Among his contemporaries, however, this 
view is controversial.40 Gassendi, as we saw, denies it. He says that in cases of 
indifference, the will lacks such a power, and in his objections, he corrects Descartes: in 
38 I think this power is connected to Descartes’ conception of the will as the active faculty, which I discuss  
in Section IV of Chapter 1. 
39 Or vacuous, as Bernard Williams characterizes it: “by the mere possession of a free will, man is not  
given the ability to do anything at all, except will” (Williams 2005, 160).






                                                 
 
      
                   
    
            
      
  
 
      
     
 
cases of indifference, Descartes ought to say that the will cannot affirm or deny—that the 
will cannot will when the intellect doesn’t determine it in one direction (AT VII 316; 
CSM II 220). This underscores the point that the dispute should be understood in terms of 
the will’s relationship to the intellect. The issue is whether the will can only will when 
determined by the intellect; it is not about determinism full stop,41 but about the 
determination of the intellect. I think Descartes also has these concerns in mind in the 
Fourth Meditation, as the central case for Descartes in the Fourth Meditation is that of 
indifference. It is crucial that the will have the ability to will in conditions of 
indifference—the success of Descartes’ explanation of error and vindication of God hang 
on it. 
This interpretation of the first clause of the definition is supported by the context 
within which Descartes presents the definition. Descartes has just discussed the cognitive 
faculties—the intellect, memory and imagination—and characterizes them as “extremely 
weak and limited” (AT VII 57; CSM II 40). The will, or freedom of choice, in contrast:
I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is 
beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that I 
understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God. For 
although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine, both in virtue of 
the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and 
efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater 
41 Although Descartes affirms that the freedom we possess when the will is indifferent is incompatible with
determination by the intellect, I don’t think he takes a view, at least in the Meditations, on whether or not 
we are causally determined in those cases. By the time of his letter to Princess Elisabeth of January 1646,
he seems to hold that all of our free actions have been determined by God (AT IV 352-354; CSMK 282). 
Vere Chappell characterizes Descartes as being a compatibilist regarding the relationship between freedom 
and determinism in several ways: “We can now address the question of Descartes's compatibilism, the 
logical consistency of his position that volitions are free with each of his claims regarding their
determination by causes. Since he explicitly makes each of these claims—that volitions are caused by God, 
by the minds in which they occur, and by clear perceptions—while remaining committed to the freedom of








number of items, nevertheless, it does not seem any greater than mine 
when viewed formally and precisely in itself. (AT VII 57)
I have argued (in Section III) that it is in virtue of the unlimited scope of the will that 
humans to bear the image and likeness of God. And, as I have argued, the freedom 
humans have because of the will’s unlimited scope is the ability to choose even when the 
will is indifferent. Thus, when Descartes immediately follows this passage with the 
definition, we ought to take him as referring to that general ability that includes the case 
of indifference: the power of the will to determine itself.
Let’s turn to the second clause of the definition. Recall that the problem for 
identifying the clause as referring to liberty of spontaneity was that Descartes’ 
formulation diverges from traditional formulations of liberty of spontaneity: Descartes 
highlights our acting with the feeling that we are determined by no external force, rather 
than the actual absence of external force. The interpretation of the first clause I have 
presented helps us understand the second: we feel that we are determined by no external 
force because the will always determines itself. Even when an external force determines 
us—God, by “a divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts” (AT VII 58; CSM 
II 40)—we determine ourselves in the sense that we form a volition in response to the 
supernatural light. 
But Descartes also subscribes to liberty of spontaneity in a traditional sense: he 
holds that freedom requires the absence of external compulsion or constraint. When God 
determines us, he does so without compulsion or constraint—divine grace, like the clear 
understanding of reasons of truth and goodness, inclines the will and increases and 
strengthens our freedom (AT VII 58; CSM II 40). We are not forced to choose in this 










                                                 
 
  
compatible only when the compulsion is internal to the mind. In the great light passage, 
Descartes specifies that the compulsion that leads us to judge is not external: “I could not 
but judge that something which I understood so clearly was true; but this was not because 
I was compelled so to judge by any external force” (AT VII 59; CSM II 41). It is 
unlikely, however, that Descartes holds that freedom consists in this absence of external 
compulsion or constraint. In the 1644 letter I mentioned earlier, Descartes clarifies that 
liberty of spontaneity isn’t freedom at all:
As for animals that lack reason it is obvious that they are not free, since 
they do not have this positive power to determine themselves; what they 
have is pure negation, namely the power of not being forced or 
constrained. (AT IV 117; CSM II 234)
Thus, although freedom requires the absence of external compulsion or constraint, for 
Descartes, freedom cannot consist in such absence.
Now that we see what Descartes means with the two clauses of the definition, we 
can see why he connects them with ‘or rather’: the second clause elaborates upon the 
first. After he has asserted that the will (or freedom of choice) consists in the power of the 
will to determine itself, he clarifies that in all cases—whether they are cases of 
inclination or indifference of the will, and whether the inclination arises from a source 
internal to the mind or external to it—we feel that nothing external to us determines us 
because the will determines itself. 
This interpretation of the definition makes sense of what immediately follows it: 
For, in order to be free, there is no need for me to be able to go both 
ways42 [Necque enim opus est me in utramque partem ferri posse, ut sim 
liber]; on the contrary, the more I incline [propendeo] in one direction –
either because I clearly understand the reasons of truth and goodness point 
42 In contrast with Cottingham’s “there is no need for me to be inclined both ways,” I translate ‘feramur’ 












that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost 
thoughts – the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace nor natural 
knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and 
strengthen it. But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing 
me in one direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom; it is 
evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in 
knowledge or a kind of negation. (AT VII 57-58)
Descartes, we see, goes on to discuss all the cases I have mentioned: cases of internal 
inclination, external determination, and indifference. All of these cases are ones in which 
we act freely, because the will determines itself. 
Thus, I interpret Descartes as holding that freedom consists in our power to 
determine ourselves. This power of self-determination is not incompatibilist, but rather is 
compatible with certain forms of determination, internal and external: determination by
the intellect (cases of clear and distinct perception) and by God (his inclining our inmost 
thoughts). 
Accounting for the other features of freedom
One might think that in providing a definition, Descartes is providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for freedom. Yet, the definition cannot fully account for the features 
of freedom I presented earlier. Conceiving of freedom as consisting in the power of self-
determination does not explain why we are freest even when we cannot but judge in 
accordance with clear and distinct perception; why freedom is proportional to the will’s 
inclination; or why indifference is the lowest grade of freedom.
I think that Descartes has an account available to him that explains and unifies 
these seemingly disparate features of freedom: freedom is proportional to the ease of 
determining ourselves.  Although he does not explicitly spell out this condition in the 









                                                 
 
     
  
 
    
      
  
   
 
    
     
      
 
     
                 
                      
     
               
 
         
                
    
 
               
          
     
      
   
 
    
9, 1645,43 there is good reason to use it to understand Descartes’ Fourth Meditation 
account of freedom, as I will show. In this letter he distinguishes between the freedom we 
have before the will acts and the freedom while acting.44 In both cases, freedom may be 
thought of as proportional to the ease of determining ourselves. Before we act, he says: 
A greater freedom consists in a greater facility in determining oneself
[majori facilitate se determinandi]…if we follow the course which 
appears to have the most reasons in its favour, we determine ourselves 
more easily. (AT IV 174; CSMK 245)45 
Moreover, while we are acting: 
Freedom considered in the acts of the will at the moment when they are 
elicited…consists simply in ease of operation; and at that point freedom, 
spontaneity and voluntariness are the same thing [consistit in sola 
operandi facilitate; atque tunc liberum, spontaneum, et voluntarium plane 
idem sunt]. It was in this sense that I wrote that I moved towards 
43 This letter is notorious among commentators because in it, Descartes seems to affirm that the will has a
“positive faculty” to act contrary to clear and distinct perception. This seems quite problematic for the 
prospects of his epistemological project of the Meditations: the psychological irresistibility of occurrent 
clear and distinct perceptions is supposed to serve as an introspective mark of their clarity and distinctness 
and thereby distinguish them from sense perceptions. If we can judge contrary to clear and distinct
perception even when we are perceiving it, it would seem that we no longer have a clear method of arriving 
at the truth and avoiding error.
Tad Schmaltz takes this letter to indicate a change in Descartes’ conception of freedom from the view
he presents in the Meditations (Schmaltz 2008). I think Descartes’ affirmation of this positive faculty can
be defused to a certain extent. His affirmation includes a proviso: “it is always open to us to hold back from
pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good 
thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing” (AT IV 173; CSMK 245, my emphasis). With 
this proviso, Descartes modifies the case from one in which we are perceiving something clearly and 
distinctly to one in which the will is indifferent. Recall that Descartes says in the Fourth Meditation that the 
will is inclined in one direction when “I clearly understand that the reasons of truth and goodness point that
way” (CSM II, 40; AT VII, 58). But if I consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of the will by
acting in the other direction, I now have a reason of goodness that points in the opposite direction. And, as I 
have argued, Descartes holds that we have the freedom to go either way in cases of indifference.
44 Descartes employs the Scholastic terminology of his correspondent and distinguishes between the
freedom considered acts of the will “either before they are elicited, or after they are elicited” (AT VII 173;
CSMK 245). Elicited acts, according to the Scholastics, are acts performed by the will (as opposed to
“commanded” acts, acts performed by the intellect or the body caused by the will’s choice). Aquinas makes 
the distinction between elicited and commanded acts in Summa Theologica book II.1, question 6, article 4. 
Anthony Kenny interprets Descartes’ usage of Scholastic terminology in the same way, as “before the
will’s act, and liberty during the act” (Kenny 1972, 29).
45 In this passage, Descartes also affirms that greater freedom consists in “a greater use of the positive 
power which we have of following the worse although we see the better” (AT IV 174; CSMK 245). I take 
this conception of greater freedom to be irrelevant for understanding Descartes’ conception of freedom in 
the Fourth Meditation, since there he maintains consistently that freedom is proportional to how clearly we















something all the more freely when there were more reasons driving me 
towards it; for it is certain that in that case our will moves itself with 
greater facility and force. (AT IV 174-175; CSMK 246). 
Although this is a later letter, Descartes here connects freedom as the ease of operation 
(the will’s determining itself) back to his Fourth Meditation account of freedom. Recall 
that a central feature of freedom in the Fourth Meditation is that freedom is proportional 
to the inclination of the will:
The more I incline in one direction—either because I clearly understand 
the reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because God so 
disposes my inmost thoughts—the more freely I choose that way. (AT 
VII 57-58)
In the letter of 1645, then, Descartes is referring back to this feature of freedom. Thus, I 
suggest, we can read Descartes’ clarification from the letter of 1645—that freedom is 
proportional to the ease of the will’s determining itself— back into the Fourth Meditation 
discussion of freedom. 
When we do so, and connect it to the features of the will that I have discussed, we 
see why Cartesian freedom has the features it does. I will begin with the feature of 
freedom that Descartes referenced in the letter: the more we incline in one direction, the 
freer our choice. Descartes holds that freedom’s proportionality to the inclination of the 
will is tied to the will’s nature to tend toward the true and the good. Descartes makes this 
connection explicitly in the Sixth Replies:
As for man, since he finds that the nature of goodness and truth is 
already determined by God, and his will cannot tend toward anything else, 
it is evident that he will embrace what is good and true all the more 
willingly [libentius], and hence more freely [liberius], in proportion as he 
sees it more clearly. (AT VII 432; CSM II 292)
Since our wills tend towards the true and the good, our ability to determine ourselves is 









                                                 
 
 
            
wills incline the most. Thus, it is easier for the will to assent to the true and pursue the 
good the more clearly and distinctly we perceive it. 
This is why clear and distinct perception does not undermine our freedom, and 
why we are freest in this case: the will determines itself most easily. In the case of the 
cogito, and presumably in other cases of clear and distinct perception, our assent to the 
true follows straightforwardly from our perceiving it clearly and distinctly. Recall from 
the great light passage:
I could not but judge that what I understood so clearly was true…because 
a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the will, 
and thus the spontaneity and freedom of my belief was all the greater in 
proportion to my lack of indifference. (AT VII 58-59)
Further, if we happened to be the kind of creatures that always perceived the good and 
the true clearly and distinctly, our wills would likewise determine themselves easily— 
“[we] should never have to deliberate about the right judgment or choice,” yet we would 
be “wholly free” (AT VII 58; CSM II 40).46 
Lastly, we see why indifference is the lowest grade of freedom. Indifference, I 
have argued, is evidence of a defect or a lack of knowledge because it is that state of the 
will when we do not clearly and distinctly perceive something to be true or good. But
because of the will’s unlimited scope, the will has the freedom to move, without the 
determination of the intellect, toward one side or the other. Unlike Spinoza’s man, who 
“placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and 
46 Descartes here provides a possible way of filling in what the ease of the will’s determining itself amounts
to: ease of operation bears an inverse relation to the deliberation required. The will operates most easily












such food and drink as are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst,”47 
Descartes’ agent will not: she can simply eat (or drink).
Yet Descartes can appreciate Spinoza’s assessment of the case in the following 
way: he can agree that in cases of indifference, choosing to go one way rather than 
another is more difficult. The difficulty, as Descartes can understand it, varies 
proportionally to the indifference of the will. When we have no reasons to go one way or 
another, going one way or the other is quite difficult because of the lack of reasons—my 
choice is completely arbitrary. The choice seems similarly difficult when the reasons on 
both sides are balanced. In those cases where we do have reasons to go one way rather 
than another, but our reasons are merely probable conjectures, the choice may be easier 
than the cases in which we have no reasons or balanced reasons, but there is still some 
measure of difficulty because of the psychological mechanism Descartes mentions—“our 
assent is pushed the other way.”
One might worry that the account I have attributed to Descartes is not true to 
experience: those cases in which the account claims choosing is most difficult—cases in 
which we have no reason to go one way or another—the choice does not seem difficult at 
all. If I am confronted, like Buridan’s ass, with two apples that are identical in every way, 
the choice is easy: I simply go for one of the two. 
Although throughout this chapter, in line with Descartes’ discussion of the Fourth 
Meditation, I have assimilated action to belief, Descartes’ main concern in the Fourth 
Meditation is to account for belief, rather than action,48 and as a characterization of 
47 Spinoza 1985, 490.
48 In light of Mersenne’s worries of the Fourth Objections, Descartes adds in the Synopsis to the









                                                 
     
    




belief, his account is more plausible. As I take Descartes to suggest, ease of believing is 
indeed proportional to the reasons we have, since belief is responsive to evidence of truth. 
In those cases in which we clearly see the reasons pointing in one way, believing is easy, 
and it is more difficult to believe something the fewer reasons we have for it.49 
VI. Conclusion
According to the interpretation I have provided, Descartes does not approach the problem 
of free will as many have thought: as beginning with the question of whether or how 
human freedom is possible in a world that is causally determined (although his view does 
have implications for this question, as I have shown). Rather, as I have characterized him, 
Descartes starts from an account of human will and provides answers to questions that are 
interesting in their own right, including: Can we choose the bad or the false as such?
What is the nature of our power of choice when the reasons for choosing one way or 
another aren’t determining? Are our assentings to propositions free even when the 
evidence is so overwhelming that we cannot but do so? I have argued that understanding 
Descartes’ answers to these questions and his associated conception of the human will is 
essential to providing a comprehensive and unified interpretation of his conception of 
freedom in the Fourth Meditation.
distinguishing truth from falsehood” and not “matters pertaining to faith or to the conduct of life” (AT VII
15; CSM II 11).
49 This may generate another worry for Descartes’ account—whether we can, in fact, believe something
when we have absolutely no reasons to believe it. Perhaps Descartes has in mind things that we believe due 












                                                 
         
 
   
  
  
       
Chapter 3  
The Relationship between the Will and the Passions of the Soul  
Introduction
Descartes holds that the passions of the soul, the class of mental states that roughly 
corresponds to the current-day category of emotions,1 bear some relationship to the will. 
For example, Descartes explains that the “use” (usage) of the passions of the soul 
“consists in this alone: they dispose the soul to will the things nature tells us are useful 
and to persist in this volition” (AT XI 372; SV 51-52; CSM I 349). The relationship 
between the passions of the soul and the will is bi-directional, as we will see: the passions 
of the soul affect the will and the will can in some sense affect the passions of the soul. In 
this chapter, I focus on working out Descartes’ conception of this relationship.
Descartes presents his theory of the passions of the soul in his last published 
work, The Passions of the Soul, 2 in which he develops the views he discussed primarily 
with Elisabeth in their earlier stages. The passions of the soul, according to Descartes’ 
taxonomy of thought, belong to the intellect, and thus are perceptions (as opposed to 
1 One immediately apparent way in which the passions differ from the current-day category of emotions is 
that desire is one of Descartes’ primitive passions but is not a type of emotion (although on some theories
of emotions, emotions may be composed in part of desires). For an in-depth study on the evolution of 
emotions as a psychological category and discussion of the relation between passions and emotions, see 
Dixon 2003.





                                                 
  
 
   
   
     
         
   
         
      
    
 
       
  
  
volitions, which belong to the will).3 Thus they are a subset of Descartes’ more general 
category of passion:
[The thoughts] I call [the soul’s] actions are all of our volitions, because 
we find by experience that they come directly from the soul and seem to 
depend only on it; as, on the other hand, all the sorts of cases of perception 
or knowledge to be found in us can generally be called its passions, 
because it is often not our soul that makes them such as they are, and 
because it always receives them from things that are represented by them. 
(AT XI 342; SV 28; CSM I 335)
The passions of the soul4 are perceptions caused by the body5 that “we refer to the soul 
[que nous rapportons à notre âme]” (AT XI 347; SV 32; CSM I 337)6—that is, Descartes 
says, they are those perceptions “whose effects are felt as in the soul itself, and of which 
no proximate cause to which they may be referred is commonly known” (AT XI 347; SV 
32; CSM I 337).7 This contrasts with perceptions caused by the body that we refer to 
external objects, such as color and size, and perceptions caused by the body that we refer 
to our body, such as pleasure, pain, hunger, and thirst.8 As members of the general class 
of perceptions caused by the body, the passions are confused and obscure.9 Yet they are 
also “all in their nature good” (AT XI 485; SV 132; CSM I 403), Descartes says—that is, 
3 Principles I.32 (AT VIIIA 17; CSM I 204)  
4 From this point on, I refer to the passions of the soul simply as ‘the passions.’  
5 More specifically, the passions are caused by some movement of the animal spirits (AT XI 349; SV 34;  
CSM I 339).
6 There is some question about what exactly Descartes means when he says of various kinds of perceptions  
that “we refer them to [nous les rapportons à]” something. Stephen Voss suggests the following gloss: “we  
“refer” our perception to an object just in case we spontaneously judge that the action causing our  
perception is within that object” (SV 30, note 23). I will not address this issue further in this chapter.
7 Descartes officially defines the passions as “des perceptions, ou des sentiments, ou des émotions de l'âme,  
qu'on rapporte particulièrement à elle, et qui sont causées, entretenues et fortifiées par quelque mouvement  
des esprits” (AT XI 349)–“those perceptions, sensations, or emotions of the soul which we refer  
particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits”  
(CSM I 339). 
8 See Articles 22-25 (AT XI 345-348; SV 30-32; CSM I 336-338) on the differences among the kinds of  
perceptions caused by the body.







                                                 
        
             
  
they are generally useful to the preservation of the mind-body composite. There are six 
“primitive” passions,10 which are simple and not composed of any other passions: 
wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. All of the rest of the passions are either 
species or combinations of these six.11 
I begin the chapter by providing an account of the effects on the will of the 
passions as a class. In so doing, I unpack Descartes’ conception of the use or function of 
the passions. I argue that a unitary interpretation of the use of the passions is insufficient:
the use of the passions does not consist in each of the passions carrying out a certain 
function on its own. Instead, I pursue a bifurcated approach, which understands Descartes 
as conceiving of the use of the passions as having two parts, structured by the kind of 
volition involved. According to this approach, the passions both dispose and incite the 
will to form volitions to act and also strengthen useful thoughts, by which they influence 
the will in forming volitions related to judgment. The passions work together in a 
coordinated way to carry out the first function, whereas the passions individually carry 
out the second function.
For all that I will have said in the first section, one might wonder why Descartes 
holds that we need any kind of power or control over the passions. In the second section, 
I outline several ways in which Descartes conceives of the passions as problematic. I end 
this chapter with a discussion of Descartes’ view on how we can control the passions. I 
10 Descartes differs with his predecessors both regarding the number and the identity of the primitive  
passions. Aquinas, for instance, holds that there are eleven basic passions. Moreover, wonder (admiration),  
which I will discuss further in Section 1.2 is an original contribution to the list.
















     
    
 
     
   
      
explore three ways Descartes prescribes: habituation, indirect means of control, and the 
regulation of desire. 
I. How the passions affect the will
The key to understanding how the passions affect the will lies in Descartes’ conception of 
the passions’ use or function (usage).12 Descartes holds that each individual passion has 
some particular good use. In his discussions of cowardice and fear, he gives a formulation 
of this view:
Although I cannot convince myself that nature has given men any Passion 
which is always unvirtuous and has no good and praiseworthy use [usage], 
I nevertheless have a lot of trouble divining what these two may be good 
for. (AT XI 462; SV 116; CSM I 392)13 
Different passions vary in their good uses, and some of the passions have a particular use 
that directly affects the will—for example, hatred “incites the soul to will to be separated 
from the objects that are presented to it as harmful” (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). 
But Descartes also seems to hold that the passions as a class also bear a 
relationship to the will:14 
The use [l'usage] of all the passions consists in this alone: they dispose the 
soul to will15 [vouloir] the things nature tells us are useful and to persist in 
this volition, just as the same agitation of spirits that usually causes them 
12 As Daisie Radner notes, ‘usage’ is derived from the Latin ‘usus,’ which means use or employment 
(Radner 2003, 179). CSM translates ‘usage’ as “function,” whereas SV translates it as “use.” I use
‘function’ and ‘use’ interchangeably.
13 Descartes ends up finding a good use for cowardice and concludes that since fear has no good use, it is
not a passion proper but simply the excess of a combination of passions.
14 Descartes also expresses this view in Article 40 (AT XI 359; SV40-41; CSM I 343).
15 Robert Stoothoff in CSM translates ‘vouloir’ in Article 40 and here in Article 52 as “want”. This is
confusing because in English, the terms ‘want’ and ‘desire’ are used interchangeably, but ‘vouloir’ is an
operation of the will, and thus an action, whereas desire is a passion—one of Descartes’ six primitive 











                                                 
         
                 
          
 
        
   
disposes the body to movements conducive to the execution of those 
things. (AT XI 372; SV 51-52; CSM I 349)
My primary objective in this section is to present an account of the passions’ effects on 
the will, which surprisingly receive only cursory treatment in the literature on the 
passions.16 
I.1. Unitary approaches to the use of the passions
The few accounts that attempt to flesh out the passions’ effects on the will take a 
“unitary” approach, in which they assume that each of the passions affects the will in one 
and the same way. This approach has much appeal, as it provides a simple and unified 
explanation of the passions’ function. I will present two versions of a unitary approach 
and discuss what I take to be the main problems with them, which I will argue provide us 
with reason to pursue an alternative approach.
 Representation accounts
One way of understanding the passions’ effects on the will is as due to their nature as 
representational states. The passions, one version of the “representation” account goes, 
“move the will to pursue or to shun objects in virtue of being representations of those
objects as good or evil.”17 Since Descartes explicitly identifies what is represented to us 
16 Most commentators go into very little detail, if any, about Descartes’ view that the passions have an
effect on the will. Anthony Levi, for instance, leaves it at “the principal effect of the passions is to stimulate
the actions of the soul” (Levi 1964, 270). One notable exception is Greenberg 2007, which I will discuss in 
the next section.
17 Hoffman 1991, 163, my emphasis. Gary Hatfield makes a similar point: “as modes of intellect that
represent the good, the bad, or the important, they naturally move the will, which means that they have an 






                                                 
 
as “good from our point of view” with “being suitable to us” (AT XI 374; SV 53; CSM I 
350), a refinement of this kind of account understands that “the passions’ power to 
influence the will resides in their representing things as suitable or unsuitable to our 
nature.”18 
The main problem with this interpretation is that if the passions affect the will in 
virtue of representing what is suitable or unsuitable to our nature, then all sensations 
would have this effect on the will, since, as Descartes tells in the Sixth Meditation, all 
sensations are representations of this sort. The implication of this view is that not only the 
passions but also internal sensations of pain and pleasure, the “natural appetites” of 
hunger and thirst, and sensory perceptions such as color or light should move the will to 
pursue or avoid objects. On the face of it, this account does seem to work for the natural 
appetites—intuitively, hunger and thirst do seem to move us to pursue what causes them.  
But the implication for internal sensations and sensory perceptions is problematic. 
The problem for internal sensations is textual. In the context of discussing the generation 
of action, Descartes specifies that pain and pleasure play an informational role: “the soul 
is immediately informed of things that harm the body only by the sensation it has of 
pain…so also the soul is immediately informed of things useful to the body only by some 
sort of titillation” (AT XI 430; SV 92; CSM I 377). As I will discuss in Section I.2,
Descartes holds that the internal sensations of pleasure and pain work in a coordinated 
way with five of the primitive passions to affect the will. Yet in this coordination, they do 
not play any motivational role, but solely serve to inform the mind of things that harm 





   
  
 
                                                 
 
  
            
     
    
                    
    
 
  
    
 
   




and benefit it. The problem for sensory perceptions, on the other hand, is philosophical. 
The representation account, as applied to sensory perceptions like color and light, looks 
implausible, as color and light do not generally have any effect on the will. 
A further problem with representation accounts is that they fail to incorporate 
Descartes’ view that desire is essential to producing action.19 If passions move the will to 
pursue things simply in virtue of being representations of the good or evil of those things, 
then it would seem that every passion by itself could incline the will to form volitions that 
result in action. But Descartes conceives of desire as the only primitive passion that 
directly influences the will to form volitions to act.20 Descartes defines desire as: 
An agitation of the soul, caused by the spirits, which disposes it to will21 
[vouloir] for the future the things it represents to itself to be suitable. Thus 
we desire not only the presence of absent good but also the preservation of 
the present, and in addition the absence of evil, both what we already have 
and what we believe we might receive in time to come. (AT XI 392; SV 
66; CSM I 358)
19 I use ‘action’ here and throughout the chapter, unless otherwise specified, in its colloquial sense, which
involves bodily movement. This contrasts with Descartes’ technical use of ‘action’ as referring to any
volition, whether or not it results in bodily movement. I will discuss this technical use later in the chapter.
20 Love and hatred, according to Descartes, individually directly influence the will, but not to form volitions
to act. Descartes has a curiously idiosyncratic view of the function of love and hatred, which he presents in
Articles 79 and 80 (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). He defines love as “an excitation of the soul, caused 
by the motion of the spirits, which incites it to join itself in volition to the objects that appear to be suitable 
to it” (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). Descartes clarifies that for the soul to join itself “in volition” with
something is for us to consider ourselves as “ joined in such a way that we imagine a whole of which we
think ourselves to be only one part and the thing loved another” (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). 
Correspondingly, hatred causes us to consider ourselves “alone as a whole, entirely separated from the 
thing for which we have the aversion” (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). It is important for my purposes
here to note that the direct effects of love and hatred are limited to our thoughts—they have no direct 
influence on action. It is only when love and hatred occur along with desire that action results. I discuss this
further in Section I.2 of this chapter.
21 Robert Stoothoff translates ‘vouloir’ in this passage as “wish.” I follow SV in taking ‘will’ to be a better 
translation for the sake of consistency (see note 15 above). But there is a more substantive reason as well: 
‘wish,’ at least in English, has the connotation of hoping for something, but hope, according to Descartes is 
a passion—specifically a species of desire. Descartes certainly would not define desire with a passion that 
is a species of it. 
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The other passions individually cannot influence the will for form volitions to act: 
Descartes says that joy, sadness, hate, and love “can incline us to any action only through 
the mediation of the Desire they excite” (AT XI 436; SV 97; CSM I 379, my emphasis).22 
The strengthening account
Another version of the unitary approach points not to the representational nature of the 
passions to understand their effects on the will but argues that Descartes holds that the 
passions affect the will through a unique mechanism.23 This “strengthening” account 
focuses on Descartes’ description of the “utility of the passions” and postulates that 
Descartes here specifies the particular mechanism by which the passions affect the will:
The utility of all the passions consists only in their strengthening thoughts 
which it is good that [the soul] preserve and which could otherwise easily 
be effaced from it, and causing them to endure in the soul. (AT XI 383; 
SV 59; CSM I 354)
It is by strengthening thoughts that the passions make those thoughts salient, focus the 
mind’s attention on them, and thereby motivate agents to will what is useful to the mind-
body composite.24 
The greatest strength of this account is that it identifies a feature of the passions as 
a class that distinguishes them from other mental states, and it suggests that this feature is 
the mechanism through which they affect the will. Unlike representing the useful and the 
harmful (the focus of the representation account), strengthening thoughts is not a feature 
22 Descartes also expresses the necessity of desire for action in Passions, Article 143: “[Joy, Sadness, Hate,  
and Love] excite Desire in us, by whose mediation they regulate our behavior” (AT XI 436; SV 97; CSM I  
379).
23 In fact, Sean Greenberg questions whether the passions are representational states at all. I cannot go into  
the details of this aspect of the account here. See Greenberg 2007.
24 Greenberg 2007, 722-726.  
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of any other class of mental states. Thus, this account does not have any difficulty 
demarcating the passions (and their function) from other kinds of sensations. This 
strength of the account, however, may also be a weakness. If it is only in virtue of 
strengthening thoughts that the passions serve to incline the will, and only passions 
strengthen thoughts, then, on this account, other mental states that we intuitively think of 
as affecting the will have no such effect. Internal sensations of pain and pleasure, since 
they do not strengthen thoughts, would not affect the will; yet it seems that pain and 
pleasure in fact do.25 
Furthermore, the strengthening account, like representation accounts, does not 
acknowledge Descartes’ view that desire is necessary for action. Again, since an adequate 
interpretation of the passions’ effects on the will must capture the importance of the role 
of desire in producing action, the strengthening account is insufficient.
Lastly, the ability of the passions to strengthen thoughts does not seem to be 
directly involved in the will’s forming volitions to act. The instances in which Descartes 
explicitly mentions any of the primitive passions strengthening thoughts are situations in 
which a volition to act need not, and likely will not, result. Descartes’ main example is 
the primitive passion of wonder. Wonder is unique among the primitive passions in its 
particular object—wonder does not have good or evil as its object but only knowledge of 
the thing wondered at. Consequently, wonder does not seem involved in the will’s 
forming volitions to act, but only volitions related to knowledge. Wonder’s lack of 
25 This may also be a problem for the coordination account I develop in the next section in that, according
to my account, pain and pleasure do not by themselves affect the will. On the coordination account, 










involvement in the will’s forming volitions to act is highlighted by its underlying 
physiology. The movements of the animal spirits in wonder, unlike their movements in 
the other primitive passions, actually prevent us from acting in order to facilitate the 
consideration of an object: the movement of the animal spirits flow from the brain “into 
the muscles for keeping the sense organs in the same position they are in” (AT XI 380; 
SV 57; CSM I 353). In another example, Descartes says desire is “entirely employed in 
strengthening the idea of the desired object” (AT XI 417; SV 82; CSM I 370) in the brain 
when we imagine that it is impossible to do something to acquire the object. But per 
hypothesis, because we think that the object is unattainable, we will not be inclined to 
form a volition to pursue the desired object. In fact, in this case, when desire strengthens 
the thought of the desired object, “it leaves the rest of the body languishing” (AT XI 417; 
SV 82; CSM I 370). 
I.2 A bifurcated approach
The main versions of the unitary approach, I have argued, are problematic—both 
textually and philosophically—as interpretations of the passions’ use. In this section, I 
will develop what I will call a “bifurcated” approach: I will show that the passions’ use 
should be understood as having two aspects, depending on the kind of volition that the 
passion leads the will to form. 
Descartes distinguishes two kinds of volitions, or “actions”: 
The first are actions of the soul which have their terminus in the soul 








                                                 
  
      
     
 
                   
      
           
             
   
 
some object that is not material. The others are actions which have their 
terminus in our body, as when, from the mere fact that we have the 
volition to take a walk, it follows that our legs move and we walk. (AT XI
343; SV 28; CSM I 335)26 
Descartes here uses ‘action’ in a technical sense to refer to all volitions.27 I will argue that 
Descartes has two different mechanisms by which the passions influence the will to form 
volitions, depending on whether the volition has is terminus in the soul or in the body— 
more specifically, whether the volition is related to judgments or to actions (in the non-
technical sense).28 
I will begin by presenting the “coordination”29 account of most of the passions’ 
effect on the will. In this account we will see that five of the primitive passions—love, 
hatred, desire, joy, and sadness—work in a coordinated way with sensations to “incite” 
and “dispose” the will to contribute to actions useful to the mind-body composite. In the 
coordination among these passions, desire plays the primary role in influencing the will. I 
will then go on to discuss the second aspect of the passions’ use: to strengthen thoughts 
that are useful to preserve in the soul. The sixth primitive passion of wonder will be 
prominent in this discussion—I will explain why it does not play an explicit role in the 
26 I use Stephen Voss’s neutral translation of the original French, “actions de l’âme qui se terminent en 
l’âme même” (AT XI 343). He notes that the meaning of this phrase is not “come to an end,” but rather
“have as an end, have their issue” (SV 28, note 20).
27 I elaborate on Descartes’ conceptions of activity and passivity in Chapter 1. 
28 Volitions involved in judgment are a subclass of volitions that have their terminus in the soul alone.
29 I take this term from Desmond Clarke, who points out that Descartes holds that there is “naturally 
instituted coordination between our sensations, the passions they generate, and the relevant behavioural 
response” (Clarke 2006, 133). I, however, do not agree with his central premise, that standard account of
Cartesian dualism (that human beings are composed of two distinct substances (material and immaterial)
and the latter is a necessary and sufficient condition for (most) mental events) should be reconsidered—at
least as a theory of the explanation of the human mind (Clarke 2006, 1).
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coordination account and highlight its role in disposing the will to form volitions related 
to judgment.30 
The coordination account
We saw earlier that Descartes holds that the passions’ use is to “dispose the soul to will 
the things nature tells are useful and to persist in this volition” (AT XI 372; SV 51-52; 
CSM I 349). He seems to simply reiterate this conception of the passions’ use later in the 
Passions:
According to the institution of Nature, [Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and 
Sadness] all have reference to the body, and are given to the soul only 
insofar as it is joined with [the body], so that their natural use [leur usage 
naturel] is to incite the soul to consent and contribute to actions which can 
serve to preserve the body or render it more perfect in some way. (AT XI 
430; SV 92; CSM I 376) 
In this passage, however, in contrast with the earlier passage, Descartes is concerned only 
with those volitions that result in bodily movement.31 Descartes clarifies explicitly both 
in the title and the body of the article that he is concerned with the use of the passions 
“insofar as they have reference to the body [en tant qu’elles se rapportent au corps]” (AT 
XI 429; SV 91; CSM I 376).32 Volitions that have their terminus in our body serve to 
preserve the body or render it more perfect in some way. 
30 I focus on the primitive passions in my account, since, as I have mentioned, all of the other passions are
species or combinations of these six, and presumably the basic account can be modified appropriately for 
the others. 
31 Paul Hoffman also makes this point (Hoffman 1991, 165). Descartes uses ‘action’ in this restricted sense
also in Article 143, as he identifies ‘action’ not with ‘volonté,’ as he does when explaining the two kinds of
volitions in the passage above, but with ‘moeurs,’ translated by both CSM and SV as “behavior” (AT XI
436; SV 96; CSM I 379).
32 This is in contrast with the use of the passions “insofar as they have reference to the soul” (AT X1 432; 







   
                                                 
  




       
  
               
        
      
      
   
  
            
 
Descartes then goes on to explain how the passions incite the soul to consent and 
contribute to beneficial actions:
And in this context, Sadness and Joy are the first two that are employed. 
For the soul is immediately informed of things that harm the body only by 
the sensation it has of pain, which produces in it first the passion of 
Sadness, next Hatred of what causes the pain, and in the third place the 
Desire to get rid of it. So also the soul is immediately informed of things 
useful to the body only by some sort of titillation, which, exciting Joy in it, 
next arouses love of what one believes to be its cause, and finally the 
desire to acquire what can make one continue having this Joy or enjoy one 
like it later on again. This shows that all five of them are very useful with 
respect to the body. (AT XI 430; SV 92; CSM I 377)
It is important to reiterate what I mentioned briefly in the discussion of representation 
accounts: the passions, in addition to working with one another, also work together with 
the sensations of pain and pleasure, which have the function of informing us of what is 
useful or harmful to mind-body composite. Here Descartes relies on what he explained in 
the Sixth Meditation:
The proper purpose of the sensory perceptions given to me by nature is 
simply to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful to the 
composite of which the mind is a part; and to this extent they are 
sufficiently clear and distinct. (AT VII 83; CSM II 57) 33 
33 Descartes classifies the passions explicitly as a kind of sensation. See Principles IV.189-190 (AT VIIIA
315-318; 279-281) and Passions I.27 (AT XI 349; SV 33-34; CSM I 338-339). Thus, some commentators 
have taken the Sixth Meditation explanation of the function of sensations to apply to all sensations—not
only the internal sensations of pain and pleasure, sensory perceptions such as color and light, and the 
natural appetites of thirst and hunger (Descartes’ focus in the Sixth Meditation), but also the passions.  
Stephen Voss, for example, argues that the Sixth Meditation account of the purpose of sensations should be 
extended to the passions: “The goodness of the passions is a consequence of the perfection of their author.
According to the Sixth Meditation, the perceptions we refer to external objects [sensory perceptions] or to
our body [internal sensations] are given to us by God “to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful
for the composite of which the mind is a part; to this extent they are sufficiently clear and distinct” (AT VII
84; CSM II 57). Mutatis mutandis, the same is true of the perceptions we refer to the soul alone—the
passions of the soul” (SV 133, note 46). See also Alquié 1973, 1100, note 1 for another expression of this
view.
According to the account I am presenting in this chapter, the passions’ function is not the same as 





                                                                                                                                                 
    
 
             
Descartes explains that the sensations of pain and pleasure initiate sequences of
passions34 that work together to affect the will. In particular, the sensation of pain 
produces sadness in the soul, then hatred of what causes the pain, and then the desire to 
get rid of it; alternatively, the sensation of pleasure produces joy in the soul, love of what 
one thinks is the cause, and then the desire to acquire it. Descartes does not explain in this 
article why the passions occur in the particular order they do, but earlier in the Passions, 
his explanation for why joy ordinarily follows pleasure (and sadness ordinarily follows 
pain) reveals that the order results from what joy is (and what sadness is). Pleasure 
produces a brain impression that represents to the soul the body’s sound condition and 
strength as a good belonging to the mind-body union (AT XI 399; SV 71; CSM I 362). 
Since joy “consists the enjoyment the soul has of the good which the impressions 
represent to it as its own” (AT XI 396; SV 69; CSM I 360), joy ordinarily follows 
pleasure. Analogous reasoning for the body’s damaged condition and weakness explains 
why sadness ordinarily follows pain. 
Desire plays the key role in the coordination since, as we saw, it has the particular 
function of directly influencing the will to form volitions to act. Aversion, traditionally a 
passion distinct from desire, is for Descartes just another way of conceiving desire—“it is 
always the same movement that inclines us to the search for the good and at the same 
time to the avoidance of the evil that opposes it” (AT XI 393; SV 66; CSM I 359)—since 
seeking good, he claims, is also avoiding evil. So desire plays the central role in 
or harmful to the mind-body composite. Instead, the passions’ function is to affect the will, in the ways I  
describe.  






influencing the will to form volitions both to pursue what is useful and to avoid what is 
harmful.
Of course, joy and love (and sadness and hatred) can occur in the soul 
independently of desire and independently of one another. Moreover, some of these 
passions independently can affect the will: Descartes says that love “incites [the soul] 
join itself in volition to the objects that appear to be suitable to it” (AT XI 387; SV 62; 
CSM I 356) whereas as mentioned earlier, hatred “incites the soul to will to be separated 
from the objects that are presented to it as harmful” (AT XI 387; SV 62; CSM I 356). But 
according to the account I am developing here, in order for the passions to influence the 
will to form volitions that result in bodily movement, they must work in coordination 
with one another, and desire is necessary for directly influencing the will to form 
volitions to pursue what is useful and avoid what is harmful. 
At this point, one might question the plausibility of this interpretation, as it seems 
to imply that Descartes holds that we are not moved to act unless this particular sequence 
of sensations and passions occurs. The worry is that there are situations in which we seem 
to be moved to act without any pain or pleasure involved, as in Descartes’ own examples 
of the coward, who is moved simply by fear to run away, and the courageous individual, 
who is moved simply by boldness to stay and fight (AT XI 359; SV 41; CSM I 343). 
There are several ways in which Descartes could respond. First, he could say that the 
coordination account depicts the typical case, but not every case of action. He 
acknowledges that there are situations in which the passions do not operate precisely in 
the way the coordination account suggests:
Though this use of the passions is the most natural one they can have…it 









                                                 
     
 
     
          
         
harmful to the body that cause no Sadness at the beginning, or even give 
Joy, and others that are useful to it though they are distressing at first. (AT 
XI 431; SV 93; CSM I 377)
Cases in which harmful things do not produce sadness perhaps are malfunctions of the 
mechanisms of nature, and as Stephen Voss suggests, similar to the dropsy case of the 
Sixth Meditation.35 Secondly, Descartes seems to think that in our untutored thinking 
about the passions, we may be mistaken about the identity of passions. For example, we 
often conflate pleasure and pain with joy and sadness: “titillation of the senses is so 
closely followed by Joy, and pain by Sadness, that most men do not distinguish them” 
(AT XI 399; SV 71; CSM I 361). Thus, although it may seem to us that pain and pleasure 
are not involved when we act, they may in fact be, and we are not separating out pleasure 
from our feeling of joy and pain from our feeling of sadness.
In regard to the particular examples of fear and boldness, though, Descartes has 
the resources to provide a more robust defense. He conceives of fear and boldness as 
species of desire,36 which, as we have seen, is the component of the coordination account 
that directly moves the will to form volitions to pursue what is useful or avoid what is 
harmful. According to Descartes, boldness “disposes the soul to the execution of things 
that are most dangerous” (AT XI 460; SV 113; CSM I 390), whereas fear “takes away 
[the soul’s] power to resist the evils it thinks are near” (AT XI 462; SV 115; CSM I 392). 
Thus, it is plausible that in these examples, Descartes is providing a shorthand 
35 SV 93, note 62. Descartes might be able to give an analogous response to why this malfunction does not 
undercut God’s goodness. I discuss Descartes’ vindicating explanation in Section III.1 of this chapter. 
36 Fear and boldness are variants of desire in which we also take into consideration whether the likelihood
of obtaining what we desire is great or small. When there is difficulty in the choice of means or the 
execution, boldness results, and fear is its opposite. See Articles 57-59 (AT XI 374-376; SV 53-54; CSM I











                                                 




characterization that leaves out the earlier passions in the sequence. He could provide a 
variant of the coordination account that would have fear and boldness, as species of 
desire, carry out the function of desire and serve to directly influence the will to form 
volitions. 
Strengthening useful thoughts
According to the coordination account, then, five of the six primitive passions work in 
coordination with sensations and one another to influence the will to form volitions that 
result in bodily movement. But as I discussed earlier, volitions are of two kinds—those 
related to bodily movement and those that “have their terminus in the soul itself.” One 
large subclass of this second kind of volition is passions involved in judgment. In this 
section, I will show that the passions individually affect the will’s formation of volitions 
involved in judgment by strengthening and preserving useful thoughts. 
Wonder, the sixth primitive passion, is particularly useful in disposing the will to 
form those volitions involved in judgment.37 As there has been very little discussion of 
wonder in the secondary literature on the passions,38 I will spend some time exploring 
Descartes’ conception of wonder and its functions. 
Descartes defines wonder as “a certain surprise of the soul which makes it tend to 
consider attentively those objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary” (AT XI 380; 
SV 56; CSM I 353). Wonder’s object—what seems rare and extraordinary—is particular 
37 As I discussed in the first chapter, Descartes holds that the operation of the will is necessary for us to  
make judgments—in the Fourth Meditation, he highlights affirmation and denial as volitions involved in  
judgments. 






                                                 
 
       
     
     
  
to it. The object of all of the other primitive passions is what appears good or evil—that 
is, what appears useful or harmful to the mind-body composite.39 Because things seem 
rare and extraordinary to us before we ever perceive them to be good or evil, Descartes 
calls wonder “the first of all the passions” (AT XI 373; SV 52; CSM I 350).40 
Wonder has several functions. First, it allows us to notice what appears rare 
because it is new to us or different from what we have experienced (AT XI 384; SV 59; 
CSM I 354-355). Wonder also makes us pay attention to the rare object, as Descartes 
indicates in his definition of wonder. But wonder is not only useful for making us notice 
something and keeping our attention focused on it, wonder is also useful in later stages of 
information processing—Descartes points out that wonder has the particular function of  
“making us learn and retain in our memory things we have previously been ignorant of” 
(AT XI 384; SV 59; CSM I 354).
Unlike the five primitive passions discussed in the previous section, wonder has 
no relation to volitions that result in bodily movement. By making us notice things and 
attend to them, wonder affects the will’s formation of volitions related to judgment. The 
distinction I am making here between volitions that result in bodily movement and those 
involved in judgment does not map onto the distinction between the practical and the 
theoretical—wonder can help us make both practical and theoretical judgments, and even 
gain practical and theoretical knowledge. Not only does wonder “[dispose] us to the 
39 Recall that Descartes explicitly identifies what is represented to us as “good from our point of view” with
“being suitable to us” (AT XI 374; SV 53; CSM I 350).
40 Deborah Brown explains, “[wonder] is the first passion because it occurs before we know whether an 
object is beneficial or harmful to us and is therefore presupposed by every other passion that attaches some










                                                 
   
 
             
      
 
acquisition of the sciences” (AT XI 385; SV 60; CSM I 355), but it is also relevant to a 
certain kind of knowledge that is instrumental to changing our behavior.41 Because 
wonder helps provide both knowledge of the world and knowledge of ourselves, which 
we need in order to pursue what is beneficial to the mind-body composite, wonder’s use 
is prior to the coordination account.
Descartes explains how wonder carries out its various functions: 
Now it is easy to understand from what has been said above that the utility 
of all the passions consists only in [l’utilité de toutes les passions ne 
consiste qu’en] their strengthening thoughts which it is good that [the 
soul] preserve and which could otherwise easily be effaced from it, and 
causing them to endure in the soul. (AT XI 383; SV 59; CSM I 354) 
This passage, from Article 74, which is entitled “wherein all the passions are serviceable 
and wherein they are harmful,” interrupts Descartes’ discussion of wonder, which spans 
Articles 70 through 78. As this passage occurs in the middle of Descartes’ discussion of 
wonder, I take Descartes in this text to be explaining primarily how wonder affects the 
will in forming volitions related to judgment, and then generalizing to all of the passions.
It is important to note that here Descartes is not making the claim that the only utility of 
the passions is their strengthening useful thoughts, as the strengthening account would 
have us believe. Instead, “the utility of all the passions consists only in their 
strengthening thoughts” because strengthening useful thoughts is the only function that 
41 The passion of générosité is a species of wonder, and consists “partly in [one’s] understanding that there
is nothing which truly belongs to him but the free control of his volitions, and no reason why he ought to be
praised or blamed except that he uses it well or badly” (AT XI 446; SV 104; CSM I 384). The cultivation 
of générosité is one main way Descartes thinks that we can affect our behavior and master the passions. I









                                                 
 
all of the passions share in common.42 As we saw in the previous section, wonder does 
not play any part in disposing the will to form volitions related to action. 
Descartes does not spell out how it is that the passions’ strengthening thoughts 
inclines the soul to form volitions related to judgment. One possible way of 
understanding the connection is in terms of the clarity of perceptions. Descartes defines 
clarity in the Principles:
I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentive 
mind – just as we say that we see something clearly when it is present to 
the eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and 
accessibility. (AT VIIIA 22; CSM I 207)
When wonder strengthens a thought of what is rare and the other passions strengthen a 
thought of good or evil, the thought seems clear to us. The strengthening effect of the 
passions makes the mind notice the thought, dwell on it, and preserves it in the mind. 
Because a passion makes the thought strong and present to the mind, as clear thoughts are 
in and of themselves, the will is particularly inclined to supply a mental attitude and make 
a judgment about it. 
Descartes does not specify what particular thoughts the passions serve to 
strengthen—he says only that the passions strengthen thoughts that it is good for the soul 
to preserve.  Presumably, thoughts regarding what is good, evil, and rare are good for the 
soul to preserve so that we can make judgments about them—judgments that both 
contribute to our knowledge of the world and ourselves and better help us navigate the 











                                                 
     
          
       
   
       
world around us. Descartes mentions both the understanding and the senses as sources of 
such thoughts.43 
II. Interlude: how the passions are problematic
I have argued that the passions affect the will in two ways. First, in coordination with one 
another and pain and pleasure, five of the primitive passions dispose the will to those 
actions that are conducive to the well being of the mind-body composite. Second, the 
passions individually help us pay attention and notice things that are useful to us, and 
thereby dispose the will to form volitions involved in judgment and play a role in our 
acquisition of new knowledge of things.
Descartes holds not only that the passions are instrumentally valuable in these 
ways, but also that some of them are intrinsically valuable—that there is something 
valuable in the experience of some of the passions in themselves.  At the end of the 
Passions he summarizes:
As for those [pleasures] that are common to [the soul] and the body, they 
depend entirely on the Passions, so that the men they can move the most 
are capable of tasting the most sweetness in this life. (AT XI 488; SV 134-
135; CSM I 404)
Here Descartes characterizes the passions generally as tied to the pleasures of the mind-
body composite. We see this conception of the passions’ goodness even more clearly in 
his descriptions of particular passions—for instance, joy:
43 For instance, he says, “Now even though something which has been unknown to us may be newly
present to our understanding or our senses, we do not on that account retain it in our memory unless the 
idea we have of it is strengthened in our brain by some passion, or alternatively by the application of our 
understanding, which our will fixes in a particular [state of] attention and reflection. And the other passions 
can serve to make one notice things which appear good or evil, but we just have wonder for ones which 









   
 
 
Joy is a delightful excitation of the soul, wherein consists the enjoyment it 
has of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its 
own. I say that it is in this excitation that the enjoyment of good consists, 
because in reality the soul receives no other fruit from all the goods it 
possesses. (AT XI 396; SV 69; CSM I 360)
As I have portrayed them thus far, then, the passions seem to be entirely for our benefit.
But Descartes also conceives of the passions as something we need to have power 
over: he claims, “there is no soul so weak that it cannot, when well guided, acquire an 
absolute power over its passions” (AT XI 368; SV 47; CSM I 347). In this section, I will 
outline two ways in which Descartes conceives of the passions as problematic, and 
thereby motivate Descartes’ view that we need to control them. 
First, although Descartes holds that for something to qualify as a passion, it has to 
have some good and praiseworthy use, the excess of a passion (or a combination of 
passions) always negatively affects us. The negative effects manifest themselves 
differently, depending on the function of the particular passion. For example, an excess of 
wonder “eradicate[s] or pervert[s] the use of reason,” (AT XI 385; SV 59-60; CSM I 
355). Alternatively, fear, “takes away [the soul’s] power to resist the evils it thinks are 
near” (AT XI 462; SV 115; CSM I 392). 
Second, and more significantly, Descartes holds that the passions can lead us 
astray. One way they do this is by misdirecting our attention. In the Fourth Meditation, 
Descartes suggests that proper use of our attention is an important part of the process of 
obtaining knowledge:
I shall unquestionably reach the truth, if only I give sufficient attention to 
all the things which I perfectly understand, and separate these from all the 
other cases where my apprehension is more confused and obscure. (AT
VII 62; CSM II 43)










All the evil [the passions] can cause consists either in their strengthening 
and preserving those thoughts [it is good that the soul preserve and which 
could otherwise easily be effaced from it] more than necessary or in their 
strengthening and preserving others it is not good to dwell on. (AT XI 
383; SV 59; CSM I 354)
The passions misdirect our attention in two ways—they can strengthen and preserve 
thoughts it is good for the soul to preserve to too great an extent, or they can strengthen 
and preserve thoughts it is not good for the soul to dwell on. Because of this misdirection 
of attention, we can easily make judgments when we ought not to do so.
Another way the passions lead us astray is by making goods and evils seem 
greater and more important to us than they are: 
[The passions] almost always make both the goods and the evils they 
represent appear much greater and more important than they are, so that 
they incite us to seek the former and flee the latter with more ardor and 
more anxiety than is suitable. (AT XI 431; SV 93; CSM I 377)
This view of the passions runs throughout Descartes’ various discussions of the passions. 
In a September 1, 1645 letter to Elisabeth, Descartes says that “the source of all the evils 
and all the errors of life” (AT IV 284; LS 108; CSMK 263) is that pleasures that pertain 
to man often seem greater than they are. The passions can cause this: “often passion 
makes us believe that certain things are much better and more desirable than they are” 
(AT IV 284; LS 108; CSMK 264). Descartes goes on to generalize about all of the 
passions:
There are none which do not represent to us the good to which they tend 
more vividly than is merited and which do not make us imagine pleasures 
much greater before we possess them than we find them afterward, once 
we have them (AT IV 285; LS 108; CSMK 264). 
Shortly after, in another letter to Elisabeth, dated September 15, 1645, he reiterates the 
statement from the Passions that “all our passions represent to us the goods they incite us 













                                                 
 
 
By misrepresenting goods and evils, the passions over-motivate us and cause us to hastily 
pursue or avoid things. 
III. What power does the will have over the passions?
Because the passions are problematic in these ways, Descartes holds that we need to 
control them. But since the passions are both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, 
Descartes does not advocate apatheia, unlike the Stoics and their followers—he does not 
think that we ought to rid ourselves altogether of the passions.44  Rather, the aim is to 
become “masters” of them and “manage” them (AT XI 488; SV 135; CSM I 404). In this 
section I will discuss three ways in which Descartes thinks we have some measure of 
power over the passions.
III.1 Habituation
Descartes holds that we cannot simply will the passions away or will to feel different 
passions. We lack this kind of direct control of the passions, in Descartes’ view, because 
of the naturally instituted correlations between mind and body. He summarizes his view 
about the mind-body correlations in his letter to Chanut, written on February 1, 1647: 
The soul’s natural capacity for union with a body brings with it the 
possibility of an association between each of its thoughts and certain 
motions or conditions of this body so that when the same conditions recur 
in the body, they induce the soul to have the same thought; and conversely 
when the same thought recurs, it disposes the body to return to the same 
condition. (AT IV 604; CSMK 307)
44  Descartes explicitly acknowledges this in a letter to Elisabeth, dated May 18, 1645: “I am not one of








God has set up these correlations for our benefit: in the Sixth Meditation Descartes 
characterizes them as “the best system that could be devised” (AT VII 88; CSM II 60) for 
sensations to carry out their purpose of informing us of what is useful or harmful to us. 
The system, he says, “is most especially and most frequently conducive to the 
preservation of the healthy man” (AT VII 87; CSM II 60). For instance, when the nerves 
in a person’s foot are agitated “in a violent and unusual manner,” the nervous system 
transmits a signal that produces the sensation of pain as occurring in the foot (AT VII 88; 
CSM II 60). Because of the correlation between the particular agitation of the nerves and 
the sensation of pain as occurring in the foot, we are efficiently informed that the cause of 
the pain is harmful to the foot and this prompts us to do something to get rid of it. 
Although the system of mind-body correlations has been set up by nature, 
Descartes suggests that we can change them in some sense: “although each movement of 
the gland seems to have been joined by nature to each of our thoughts, one can 
nevertheless join them to others by habituation” (AT XI 368-369; SV 47; CSM I 348). He 
elaborates: 
I have included among these remedies [for the misuses or excesses of the 
passions] the forethought and skill by which we can correct our 
constitutional deficiencies, in applying ourselves to separate within us the 
movements of the blood and the spirits from the thoughts to which they 
are usually joined. (AT XI 486; SV 133; CSM I 403)
Because of these statements, some have taken Descartes to hold that we can modify the 





   
                                                 
 
         
   
      
 
 
Descartes in these passages:45 “ he is suggesting that we can re-institute at least some of 
the associations themselves. Insofar as he claims we can rehabituate ourselves in this 
way, Descartes claims that the associations between mental and physical states are
changeable.”46 According to this interpretation, Descartes modifies his view in the 
Passions from that of the Meditations: mind-body correlations in the Meditations are 
fixed, but in the Passions they are modifiable.47 
Yet the texts are consistent with an alternative interpretation. We need not 
conclude that the connections between mind and body are being changed in habituation. 
Indeed, we have reason to avoid this conclusion, as the fixed nature of the correlations is 
central to both the Sixth Meditation explanation of the function of sensations, and 
Descartes’ vindication of God’s goodness in setting up the system of correlations. We are 
efficiently informed of pain as occurring in the foot because the particular agitation of the 
nerves is correlated with the particular sensation of pain as in the foot. Further, it is 
because mind-body correlations are fixed that God is not responsible for what Descartes 
calls “true errors of nature” (AT VII 85; CSM II 59), cases such as dropsy and phantom 
limb pain that seem to deceive us about the state of the mind-body composite. Regarding 
these deceptive cases, he says, “this deception of the senses is natural, because a given 
motion in the brain must always produce the same sensation in the mind” (AT VII 88; 
CSM II 61, my emphasis). Since God has instituted these connections for our good, they 
45 Along with Article 44: “each volition is naturally joined to some movement of the gland, but…by artifice  
or habituation one can join it to others” (AT XI 361; SV 42; CSM I 344),
46  Shapiro 2003, 229. Among others, Ferdinand Alquié (Alquié 1973, 994, note 1), Paul Hoffman  
(Hoffman 1991), Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (SV xx-xxi), and Stephen Voss (SV 133, note 46) also advance  
this view.  








                                                 
 
generally accurately indicate to us facts about what is beneficial or harmful for us as 
mind-body composites. A mistake here and there is a tolerable byproduct of the law-like 
connections between mind and body: “it is much better that it should mislead on this 
occasion than that it should always mislead when the body is in good health” (AT VII 89; 
CSM II 61). If the correlations between mind and body are modifiable, however, this 
vindicating explanation seems to be in danger. 
Gary Hatfield presents an alternative interpretation according to which the 
connections between mind and body are not being changed in habituation, but rather, the 
physical structure of the brain is.48 He takes his cue from Descartes’ discussion of how 
the same cause can excite different passions in different individuals:
All brains are not disposed in the same manner, and the same movement 
of the gland which in some excites fear, in others makes the spirits enter 
the brain’s pores that guide part of them into the nerves that move the 
hands for self-defense, and part of them into those that agitate the blood 
and drive it toward the heart in the manner needed to produce spirits 
suitable to continue this defense and sustain the volition for it” (AT XI 
358-359; SV 40; CSM I 343)
Hatfield points out that there are two possible interpretations of this passage: on one 
interpretation, the same type of brain state causes different bodily responses (fight vs. 
flight) and mental states (boldness vs. fear) in different individuals—that is, the brain-
mind connections vary among individuals. On the other, “the differences between 
individuals pertain to the linkage between brain images or ‘impressions’ of a frightful 
object, such as a bear, and two subsequent brain states, one of which differs between 










                                                 
 
 
individuals and accounts for the differences in both behavior and passion.”49 He fleshes 
out an account according to which an image of a frightful animal causes the passion of 
apprehension in both the bold and the fearful. In the bold, the passion of apprehension 
causes further brain states that cause the fight response and the passion of courage, 
whereas in the fearful, the passion of apprehension causes further brain states that cause 
the flight response and intensify the passion itself into feelings of fear and terror. 
According to this account, then, the changes between mind and body occur indirectly
either through alterations between brain states or changes in linkages between mental 
states. The mind-body connections themselves never change.
Hatfield argues that all of Descartes’ examples of habituation “either directly 
imply or are consistent with” his account of indirect change.50 Descartes’ main example 
of habituation is the case of learning a language. When we see a word, our perceiving of 
the word excites a movement in the pineal gland that nature has joined to the thought of 
the shape of the letters. But as we acquire the disposition to think of the meaning of the 
words, a new connection between mental states is forged: we associate the shape of the 
letters with the word’s meaning. In a different example, the change is in the connection 
between brain states:
When someone unexpectedly comes upon something very foul in food he 
is eating with relish, the surprise of this encounter can so change the 
disposition of the brain that he will no longer be able to see any such food 
afterwards without abhorrence, whereas previously he used to eat it with 
pleasure. (AT XI 369; SV 48; CSM I 348)
49 Hatfield 2007, 22.











                                                 
 
      
    
   
 
 
   
                    
    
After encountering something foul, the brain image of the food is no longer associated 
with the brain state associated with the passion of pleasure but rather with the brain state 
associated with the passion of abhorrence.
This latter kind of habituation—modifying the connections between brain states— 
is not something we can intentionally implement, and thus, I think, not a fruitful means of 
controlling the passions.51 However, changing the associations between mental states, 
developing what Hatfield calls “mental habits,”52 does seem to me to be an important 
way in which Descartes thinks we can control the passions. I will turn now to these 
indirect means of controlling the passions.
III.2 Indirect means
In an article entitled, “What the power of the soul is with respect to the passions,” 
Descartes specifies how we may indirectly excite passions:
Our passions cannot likewise53 be directly excited or displaced by the 
action of our will, but they can be indirectly by the representation of things 
which are usually joined with the passions we will to have and opposed to 
the ones we will to reject. Thus in order to excite boldness and displace 
fear in oneself, it is not sufficient to have the volition to do so—one must 
apply oneself to attend to reasons, objects, or precedents that convince 
[one] that the peril is not great, that there is always more security in 
defense than in flight, that one will have glory and joy from having 
51 Descartes’ other examples of this kind of habituation likewise seem to be changes that inadvertently
happen to us: for instance, because a child has gotten a severe headache from the smell of roses or been 
badly frightened by a cat, “the idea of the Aversion he had then for the roses or the cat may remain 
imprinted in his brain to the end of life” (AT XI 429; SV 91; CSM I 376)
52 Hatfield 2007, 27.
53 Descartes prefaces this passage with a discussion of how we cannot directly dilate our pupils simply by
having the volition to do so, since nature hasn’t joined the movement of the gland associated with dilation 









                                                 
    
    
conquered, whereas one can expect only regret and shame from having 
fled, and similar things. (AT XI 363; SV 43; CSM I 345)
As I discussed earlier, we cannot simply will to be bold or will to not be afraid. Rather, in 
order to foster a particular passion within us, we need to apply ourselves to attend to the 
reasons normally associated with it. But applying oneself to attend to reasons is a 
function of the will: “our will fixes [our understanding] in a particular [state of] attention 
and reflection [notre volonté determine [notre entendement] à une attention et réflexion 
particulière]” (AT XI 384; SV 59; CSM I 355).54 
Descartes elaborates further on these indirect means for controlling the passions 
toward the end of the Passions. There he provides a “general remedy for the passions” 
(AT XI 485; SV 132; CSM I 403) on those occasions for which we are not sufficiently 
prepared:
What I think I can set down here as the most general remedy for all the 
excesses of the Passions and the easiest to put into practice, is this: when 
one feels the blood stirred up like that, one should take warning, and recall 
everything presented to the imagination tends to deceive the soul, and to 
make the reasons for favoring the object of its Passions appear to it much 
stronger than they are and those for opposing it much weaker. (AT XI 487; 
SV 134; CSM I 403)
The soul “cannot completely control its passions” (AT XI 363; SV 44; CSM I 345) 
because of the physiological excitation that often accompanies the passion. Although we 
cannot prevent feeling the passions and their physiological accompaniments, we can 
control their effects by fixing our attention on other thoughts. Descartes points out that 
thinking about the passions’ effects on us is useful for this purpose—the thought that 
54 Also, “When we will to fix our attention to consider a single object for some time, this volition keeps the 













“everything presented to the imagination tends to deceive the soul” itself is a distracting 
thought that can help us control the passions. 
Descartes continues his discussion of the “general remedy”:
And when the Passion favors only things whose execution admits of some 
delay, one must abstain from making any immediate judgment about them, 
and distract oneself by other thoughts until time and rest have completely 
calmed the excitation in the blood. (AT XI 487; SV 134; CSM I 403)
Because the passions are confused and obscure thoughts, we are not determined to form 
volitions in response to them. We can withhold judgment from the objects of the thoughts 
the passions strengthen and preserve. We do this in part by attending to other thoughts.
In practical matters, unlike for theoretical matters, however, we cannot always 
simply suspend judgment or refrain from acting. Descartes acknowledges this distinction 
between the practical and the theoretical in the Discourse. He says that, as opposed to in 
the search for knowledge:
Since in everyday life we must often act without delay, it is a most certain 
truth that when it is not in our power to discern the truest opinions, we 
must follow the most probable. Even when no opinions appear more 
probable than any others, we must still adopt some; and having done so we 
must then regard them not as doubtful, from a practical point of view, but 
as most true and certain. (AT VI 25; CSM I 123)
Since the passions are not clear and distinct perceptions, the will is indifferent in some 
sense in relation to them. They serve as merely probable reasons to pursue or avoid 
something. But sometimes they can supplant clear and distinct perceptions as reasons to
pursue a course of action. In his September 15, 1645 letter to Elisabeth, Descartes says:
For since we cannot always be attentive to the same thing—even though 
we have been convinced of some truth by reason of some clear and 
evident perceptions—we will be able to be turned, afterward, to believing 
false appearances, if we do not, through a long and frequent meditation, 
imprint it sufficiently in our mind so that it turns into habit. (AT IV 295-
296; LS 113; CSMK 267)
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As the passions are a source of “false appearances” (AT IV 295; LS 113; CSMK 267), 
they misrepresent the goods and evils of the world and cause us to focus too much on 
thoughts that we ought not to consider. We must, through the action of the will, focus our 
attention on the right thoughts, in this case, those that “oppose” the reasons the passions 
represent. Thus, when we are short on time and cannot properly evaluate the reasons for 
and against a course of action, and we do not clearly and distinctly perceive the matter, 
Descartes suggests that we follow reasons that counter the considerations that the 
passions provide:
Finally, when [the Passion] incites one to actions requiring one to reach 
some resolution at once, the will must be inclined above all to take into 
consideration and to follow the reasons opposed to those the Passion 
represents, even though they appear less strong. (AT XI 487; SV 134; 
CSM I 403)
Thus, although the will cannot directly control the occurrence of passions within us, it 
can effectively counter the passions’ effects by redirecting our attention. 
III.3 Regulation of desire
I want to discuss one last method Descartes prescribes for controlling the passions: 
regulating our desires. As I have argued, desire is central to Descartes’ account of how 
the passions influence the will to form volitions related to action. Accordingly, then, 
managing our desires is an important way of controlling our actions. Descartes makes this 
connection explicit: 
Because these Passions [Love, Hatred, Joy, and Sadness] can incline us to 
any action only through the mediation of the Desire they excite, it is that 
Desire in particular which we should be concerned to regulate. (AT XI 







                                                 
 
                
 
  
              
    
Descartes diagnoses the “error most commonly committed in connection with Desires” as 
“fail[ing] to distinguish sufficiently the things that depend entirely on us from those that 
do not depend on us” (AT XI 436; SV 97; CSM I 379).55 Descartes’ concern with 
adequately distinguishing between things that depend only on us and do not depend on us 
is not new in the Passions—it forms the basis of the third maxim of his morale par 
provision of the Discourse: “to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and 
change my desires rather than the order of the world” (AT VI 25; CSM I 123-124). 
Descartes clarifies that for something to depend entirely on us simply means that it 
depends on our free will [notre libre arbitre]” (AT XI 436; SV 97; CSM I 379).56 As I 
highlighted in Chapter 1, earlier in the Passions, Descartes connects volitions with what 
depends only on us, in contrast with perceptions, which depend on the objects that they 
represent. Thus, we are to separate out what involves our volitions from what does not.
Things that do not depend on us are problematic primarily because they distract 
us from what does depend on us: “in occupying our thought, they divert us from casting 
our affection upon other things whose acquisition does depend on us” (AT XI 437-438; 
SV 98; CSM I 380). Descartes prescribes two general remedies for these “vain desires” 
(AT XI 438; SV 98; CSM I 380). The first, générosité, is a species of the passion of 
Wonder that consists in: 
55 There are, of course, things that fail satisfy either condition: things that depend both on us and on others.  
Descartes says that for things that fall into this category, we ought to separate out what depends only us, so  
that we limit our desire to that (AT XI 439; SV 99; CSM I 380)
56 Among others, Stephen Voss (SV 97, note 70) and Deborah Brown (Brown 2006, 171-176) note that this  
distinction is from the Stoics. Descartes himself seems to indicate that his inspiration is the Stoics in his  






                                                 
 
          
Partly in [our] understanding that there is nothing which truly belongs to 
[us] but this free control of [our] volitions, and no reason why [we] ought 
to be praised or blamed except that [we use] it well or badly; and partly in 
[our] feeling within [ourselves] a firm and constant resolution to use it 
well, that is, never to lack the volition to undertake and execute all the 
things [we judge] to be best—which is to follow virtue perfectly. (AT XI 
446; SV 104; CSM I 384)
Générosité helps us regulate our desires because when we possess the passion, we have 
no problem making the distinction between what depends on us and what does not. 
Furthermore, according to Descartes, we cease to value what does not depend on us. He 
says of those with générosité: “there is nothing whose acquisition does not depend on 
them which they think is worth enough to deserve being greatly wished for” (AT XI 448; 
SV 104; CSM I 385).57 
The second remedy Descartes prescribes for our vain desires is “to distinguish 
Fate from Fortune” (AT XI 440; SV 100; CSM I 381). This requires that we reflect on 
divine providence (Fate, “as it were”), “and represent to ourselves that it is impossible 
that anything should happen otherwise than has been determined by this Providence from 
all eternity” (AT XI 438; SV 98; CSM I 380). Descartes holds the view that we only 
desire what we consider to be possible in some way (AT XI 438; SV 98; CSM I 380), so 
when we find out that something is impossible, we cease to desire it. Frequently, 
however, although things do not depend on us, we think they are possible because we 
think they depend on what Descartes deems “Fortune,” “which makes things happen or 
fail to happen at its pleasure” (AT XI 439; SV 99; CSM I 380). In not knowing all the 
causes of something, we believe that there is an open possibility that it might happen, and 
57 There is much more to say about générosité, Descartes’ related conception of virtue, and the role of the







we unjustifiably desire it. We must, he holds, reject “this common opinion” about 
Fortune and understand providence’s true role in directing what occurs. Descartes 
concludes, “it is certain that when one applies oneself thus to distinguishing Fate from 
Fortune, one will easily accustom oneself to regulating one’s Desires in such a way that 
they can always give us complete satisfaction, since their fulfillment depends only on us 
(AT XI 440; SV 100; CSM I 381).
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has been devoted to understanding the relationship between the will and the 
passions. As I have argued, the passions influence the will in two ways: on the one hand, 
in coordination with one another and sensations, and, on the other, by strengthening 
thoughts. Their influence generally leads us to pursue things and make judgments that are 
beneficial to us. Yet the passions can misdirect our attention and lead us to pursue or 
avoid things too hastily, and thus we need to control them. Descartes assures us that we 
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